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INTRODUCTION
The Declaration ot Neutrality and Jay's
treaty with Great Britain were the two
most noteworthy acts in the chain ot bold
conduct, whose tradition has maintained
itselt in subsequent times. 1
The above quotation expresses very clearly the
importance of neutrality and the Jay Treaty, not only tor the
precedents that each established in the early national period,
but also tor the foundations that they established in the
tuture relationships between England and America. The main
structure ot this thesis will be built around these two documents, and other events will be discussed in their relationship
to them.
In 1?89 the United States was just beginning to
emerge and establish herself as an independent nation. Her
place amongst the nations of the world was in the formative
stage. Since independence from England had been gained, it was
necessary tor Britain to recognize the new nation. England was
the important country in the world, and had been

~erica's

colonial mother. By the Treaty or Paris ot 1?83, which conclude
the Revolutionary War, many matters (although seemingly settled)
were left in doubt. As each year passed these grievances seemed
to become even greater.
1 F.s. Oliver, Alexander Hamilton, An Eesay on American union,
G.P. Putnamts sons, New York, Bk. IV, 55.
-1-

-2-

John Adams was despatched to England in 1785 to
discuss the problems of commerce and the frontier, but his
mission failed. It seemed verT clear that England did not desire a commercial treaty with the United States. Adams knew
England's policy, and thus he wrote:
'Though I have been received here,' the
minister observes in a letter June 26,
'and treated with the distinction due
to the rank and title you have given me,
that we shall have no treaty of commerce
until this nation is made to feel the
necessity of it. Cui bono? they cry; to
what end a treaty ot' commerce, when we are
sure ot as much American trade as we have
occasion for without it.' 2
England did not respond by sending a representatiT
of her govermaent to the United States. Apparently England
did not see any importance in carrying on negotiations with
America. Finally in 1791 George

H~ond

was officially ap-

pointed as a minister to America. This appointment was probably a last resort on England's part. Mr. Payne viewed the
appointment in this manner: "Even then Hammond was not appointed until there was a threat that unless the young Republic
was recognized., congress would pass an aet discriminating
against English commerce.• 3
2 T. Lyman, The Dip1oma~r of the United States, Wells and Lilly,
Boston, 1828, I, 161.
3

G.H. Payne, England-Her Treatment of America, Sears Publishin
co., New York, 1§31, 24.

-3On the other hand the appointment showed very

clearly that now the United states was ready to be recognized
as an independent nation by a European country. Jl.though
Hammond was not authorized to negotiate a commercial treaty,
he could discuss it without obligating England in any way.
H~ond

was to try to settle the existing grievances.
America's relationship with France had been es-

tablished by a Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1778. By this
treaty France pledged her aid to .Am.erica to defeat Britain.
In return tor this aid, America incurred several obligations
to France. She was to guarantee protection to the French West
Indies; was to come to France's aid it France were attacked or
was carrying on a de:Censi ve war. France could arm and equip
privateers, and sell prizes in American ports; and finally the
principle ":Cree ahips-:Cree goods" was recognized. There were
also to be reciprocal trade arrangements. It was these provisions that caused much consternation on England's part during
the troubled year or 1793.
With the declaration ot war by France upon

Englan~

it was necessary tor America to state officially her position.
Would it be as an ally or one of the belligerents, or would

it be a middle course? The president, with the advice of his

-4-

cabinet,decided to take the middle course. This middle course,
or neutrality, by a nation was entirely new to the law of
nations. This principle served as a basis for future foreign
relations.
The events prior to and in consequence of this
proclamation will be the major aspect of this work. Neutrality
at the time seemed to affect America's relationship with France
more so than with England. The relationship between England
and America is the center of this thesis, so consequently
France has been given a very minor role. The most general
principles of neutrality will be discussed, since an understanding of these principles will be necessary in order to
analyze the associations between the two countries. The more
specific details and events have been discussed by many authors
who have made neutrality in general the subject of their works.
A commercial arrangement or another treaty which
would settle America's grievances with England, became a ne'

cessity in 1793-1794. Since England was reluctant to make any
kind of a treaty, the United States took the initiative.
~ohn

Jay was appointed by Washington, with the consent or the

Senate, as envoy extraordinary, to negotiate with Lord
Grenville, a satisfactory pact for both countries.

-5-

After muan negotiation a treaty was finally signe
on November 19, 1794. Although it was pleasing to England,
Aaeriea looked upon it with scorn. It was important for its
effect on Congress, the Executive, and the various sections ot
the country. Many precedents were established both constitutionally and diplomatically. Arbitration as a method tor
settling disputes amicably was initiated by Jay's work. This
principle has been handed down through the years, and its use
has been successful in eliminating the immediate resort to
war. According to many authors, however, this was about the
only

valuabl~

part of the treaty.
Jay's Treaty was the first important treaty rati-

fied by the newly launched government of the United states,
and its significance lies in the fact that it was consummated
with England. The future relations of the two countries were
cemented together even though there were to be innumerable
disagreements in the future. America's r.elations emerged on
an entirely different basis, for America negotiated with
Britain not as mother country to colony, but on supposed terms
of equality.
Neutrality will be given as thorough a discussion
as is possible. The discussion of Jay's Treaty will be rather

-6-

lengthy, but in order to present the material adequately this
must be done. Both will be discussed in relation to the
viewpoints of the two famous statesmen concerned with the
policy of the country. These men are Thomas Jetterson and
Alexander Hamilton. On each and every issue these two men were
at swords points- one presenting the Federalist viewpoint- the
other the Republican. On only one point were they in

agre~ent,

and that was in an overall view of the Jay Treaty; they both
thought it an aexecrable thing on the part of an old woman.• 4
Washington needed both men to help hUn make an unprejudiced
decision, as Charles Thomas pointed out:
Once again we must realize that neither
Jefferson nor H~lton could have formulated
a policy of true neutrality tor this troubled
year. Yet the presence of each was necessary
in order that the unprejudiced Washington
could select rrom the proposals or each the
elements ot a truly neutral policy. 5

4 C. Bowers, Jeti"erson and Hamilton- The Struggle tor Dem.ocrac;rl
Houghton-Mifflin Co., Boston, 192:.>.
5

c. Thomas, American Neutrality in
Press, New York, 1031, 66.

17~3,

Columbia University

-7CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARIES TO THE TREATY
The FrenCh declaration ot war on England
found the United States Gove+nment wholly
without precedent or its own as a guide or
conduct and with little information as to
specific practice by European nations in
previous wars. There were no scholarly
digests or international law to which a
perplexed official might turn with assurance,
no long-standing files ot the Department ot
state to consult, no ne~trality laws to
declare in toree. International m,ari time
law itselt was in a state ot tlux. 1
NOOTKA. SOUND

The year 1789 saw the first important question
racing America's new-government regarding a course to be pursued in the event of war between Spain and England -over the
Nootka Sound Affair. Sinee it was not too important and was
settled amicably not too many details will be presented in this
study.
Spain seized a British vessel trading in Nootka
Sound, which is an inlet on the West coast or Vancouver Island
over which Spain claimed jurisdiction. The vessel was interned
and sent to Mexico. England made an issue or this arrair in
that Spain had no right to interfere with British trade. Britai
prepared tor war because it was not merely a question ot owner1

s. Bemis, Jay's Treat:y, Macmillan Co., New York, 1923, 135.

-aship of a few trading ships, but the outposts of two great
colonial empires clashed in the northwestern part of America.
It

there would be war England would strike at

Spanish New Orleans or Louisiana trom her position in canada.
In the meantime England was impressing American seamen in the
event of actual warfare.• The United states was strategically
located between the possessions of the two countries, and had
grievances against each. If America's position did become important, she would give her help to the country offering the
most advantages. Jefferson felt that it Spain would give independence to Louisiana and Florida, the United States would
join on her side. If she did not wish to do this, he advised
strict neutrality. Note he did not urge America to join the
British side.
Later on in the controversy it became evident that
Lord Dorchester, Britain's representative in Canada, might ask
permission to march troops from Detroit to the Mississippi
River. Washington was undetermiaed as to what position should
be taken, thus he asked advioe :from Jefferson, Hamilton, and
Adams. Adams advised neutrality; Hamilton advised giving consent; Jefferson advised avoiding a direct answer.

-9-

If, as seemed probable, they asked permission
to send troops across Ameriean soil to attain
their objectives, the United States would be
placed in an unenviable position. Acquiesenee
might mean war with Spain; refusal might mean
war with Britain. As might be expected, opinions varied widely; but it was generally
agreed that the United States should, if
possible, keep out of the conflict. 2

Spain asked France to help her, but France was in
no position to help any one, thus Spain was forced to turn to
humiliation and accept the British demands. spain left Nootka,
which was the highest point of her empire on the west coast.
1lliat, then, were the beneficial results of this
episode tor the United States? According to Mr. Bailey the
first was the neutral position taken by the

Uni~ed

states; the

second was that Britain realized the importance of America;
the third, Congress could pass retaliatory oammeroial legislation against England. An American tariff would deal their
commerce a blow, tor the United States was Britain's best
overseas customer. 3

Mr. Channing gave a very brief but accurate summary of the affair:

The net result of the Nootka Sound controversy was to lay down the doctrine that
neutrality was the best policy for the
United states and to add impressment to

2 T. Bailey, A Diplomatic Histor~ of the American People, F.s.
Crofts & co., New York, 1940, 4.

-

3 Ibid ••

to the grievances already existing against
Great Britain. 4

-lo-

ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMERCE
An

analysis of the British-American commerce is

important in order to understand the relationship between neutrality and commerce.
A navigation act was passed in Congress in 1789,

the stipulations of which were the following: a duty of fifty
cents per ton was placed upon foreign built and owned vessels;
and thirty cents per ton on American built but foreign ownei
ships; ships that were built and owned by Americans paid six
cents per ton. The purpose of this discrimination was to

st~u

late interest in American commerce.

Even after the Revolutionary war the Americans
tound that they were still dependent upon Britain for many
manufactured products, although Britain's greatest trade was
not with America. Professor Bemis brought out this point regarding commerce:
on with Great

~Three-fourths

Britain~

ot American trade was carried

whereas only one-seventh of all British

trade plied back and forth between that country and the United
States.~ 5

Britain did not wish to relax any of the discriminations that were in effect against American trade after the
4

5

E. Channing, A History of the United States, Macmillan co.,
New York, 1926, V, l24.
Bemis, 190.

-11war. American ships had to pay large tonnage duties in British
ports.
The trade to Great Britain, restricted as
it was, thus constituted over seventy-fi-ve
per cent ot all the toreign commerce ot the
United States. British writers were not wrong
when they concluded that the United States
could not prosper without it. Moreover,
British ships carried over half the commerce
between the two countries. 6
The Anglo-American commerce in 1'789 was
indispensable to the prosperity ot England. 7
Ninety per cent of American imports came
trom Great Britain and the American revenue
came mostly trom tarift on imports. 8
England was old and hardened in a system of exclusion and commercial proscription. The situation was quite
different in America:
On the other hand, the United States having
no manufactures at home to protect, or
foreign possessions, whose trade it was
necessary to monopolize, found themselves
at variance on every point with the systems
ot the European governments. 9
It cannot be doubted that American commerce was
necessary to Britain, but American commerce was not as great
as Mr. Brebner maintained it to be:
She had a huge accumulated capital of
6

.!.£!!. '

34.

7 Ibid., 35.
8

~.,

36.

9 T. Lyman, The Diplomacy of the United States, I, 155.

-12-

skilled labor and management, of commercial
knowledge, and ot the ships and crews which
could find their ways (and make th~ pay)
anywhere in the world. 10
This certainly was an

exaggeratio~

ot American resources.

WEST INDIA COMMERCE

So tar the discussion has been centered about the
Anglo-American commerce, but another important aspect of trade
during this time was the West Indian trade. Since the islands,
beyond the Spanish holdings in the caribbean,were for the most
part in British possession, England wanted exclusive right to
this trade. (France, Spain, Netherlands and Denmark also had
possessions here). Mr. Bell stated that "Great Britain had
sixty million pounds invested in the islands; three-quarters
of a million of its revenue was derived from West Indian produce." 11 If she did permit America to enter into her monopoly

ot trade, it was on condition that· British ships had to carry
the products. America then could sell the West Indian products
to the world.
The following chart indicated the increase in the
reexportation ot West Indian staples from the United states to
Europe over a period of years:
10 J. Brebner, North Atlantic Triang1e,Yale University Press,

New Haven, 1945, 70.
11 H~C. Bell, "British Commercial Policy in the West Indies,

1783-93", English Historical Review, Longmans Green & Co.,
London, 1916, XXI, 450.
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12
Coffee headed the list throughout all the years, and far exceded sugar. Thus coffee was the most important product from
the West Indies that was reexported from America.
If Britain had condescended to open this trade to
the United States, it would have proven to be very profitable

tor "The West Indies, in particular, required food and lumber
from the United States; and their merchants had pressed for a
commercial treat.y in 1783.tt 13
By a British Order in Council of 1'183, the following trade was permitted:
The West Indies{jhat is the British West IndieSJ
were allowed to import American lumber, flour,
bread, grain, vegetables, and live stock, and
to export to the United states rum, sugar,
molasses, coffee, nuts, ginger, pimento. But
the importation of American meat, dairy produce,
and fish was forbidden, and the trade was
confined entirely to British ships. 14
l2 R. Walsh, An Ap~eal from the Juigments of Great Britain
Respecting the nited states ot America, Ames & White,
Philadelphia, l819. This chart was taken from Pitkin's
Statistical View, 1817.
13 A. Ward and G. Gooch, The Cambridge History ot British
Foreign Policy 1785-1919, Macmillan Co., New York, 1922,

I, 153.

14
Bell, 436.

Because ot British persistence in discrimination,
Madison proposed his resolutions in 1791. These resolutions
provided tor laws discriminating against British commerce. The
proposals were not adopted, however, they were significant in
that Britain hasten9Q to appoint a minister to the United
states. The man chosen was George Hammond.
When Hammond was appointed in 1791, he was given
no authority to conclude a commercial agreement with America.
Lord Grenville explieitly intormed Hammond that the West
Indian trade was not to be opened to America.

'It the Government of the United States
should propose that the Ships ot the
said States should be allowed to enter
the Ports ot His Majesty's Colonies in
America, and ot His Islands in the West
Indies, as they did betore the war, when
the countries belonging to these states
were British Colonies. You must give
them to understand that this Proposition
cannot be admitted even as a Subje~t of
Negociation.' 15
'rHE PR OCLAMA.TI ON

o:r

NEU'l'RALITY

The true nature and design of such an
act ~eutralit~ is to make it known to
the powers at war and to the citizens
of the country issuing the proclamation,
that that country is at peace, with the
belligerent powers and not obligated by
any treaties to beeome a party to the
war as an ally of either side, and that
15 B• .Mayo, ttinstructions to the British Ministers to the
United States l79l-l8l2tt, American Historical Association,
Annual Report, United states Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1941, III, 12.

-16conduct must be observed conformable to
the above situation and strict neutrality
maintained towards both sides. 16
The government of the United states was very
indecisive when France declared war on England. By the treaty
with France, the United States had obligated herself to come to
France's aid if France were attacked or carrying on a defensiv
war. Since France had declared war on Britain, she very
definitely put herself on the offensive side in the war.
Because or this, the defensive clause of the treaty was not
binding. That was the only reason that would justify America's
not joint.ng France.
There was no doubt but that France had been
the first to declare war against everyone
of the powers with which she was then known
to be at war. Therefore, a merely defensive
alliance could not bind the United States. 17
There were several other articles or the treaty of
1788 which caused trouble with England. These particular arti-

cles have been cited elsewhere in this work. It can be understood that Britain would look with askance upon these articles
for it seemed as though they were aimed directly at her. She
knew, too, of the pro-Freneh feeling that reigned throughout
the United States.
16 M. Woodbury, "Public Opinion in Philadelphia, 1789-1801",
Smith College, Northhampton Mass., V, 73.
17

c.

Thomas, 58.

-16-

Hamilton felt that the treaty with France had been
made with the King of France, and since the King's government
had ceased to exist, the treaty was no longer binding. Jefferson held that the treaties were made between nations and not
between governments, thus the treaty was just as binding in
1793 as it was in 1778. Both men did agree, however, that neutrality was the best possible course for America.
President Washington did not wish to com.mi t the
United states to ·either side in the controversy, if it was
possibly within his power to prevent it.
At the very first news of war in Europe,
Washington had thought of strict neutrality.
Then he had approved secretary Jefferson's
plan to modify it somewhat in favor of France,
because of the commercial interests of his
own people; and he had not been averse, at
least, to excepting Spain from the proclamation,
because'of the grave situation in the southwest
•••• But Washington returned to his first determination that the United States must be
strictly neutral toward every French endeavor,
even those against Spanish .America, as he
listened to the arguments of secretary Hamilton,
felt the constant pressure of the British
minister,H~ond, and observe the irritating
behavior of the new minister from France. 18
Washington's decision to issue the proclamation
may be defend.ed by the following:
18 A. Darling, our Rising Em.~ire 1763-1803, Yale University
Press, New Haven, 1940, ~6.

-1'7It rested with the President to judge
whether there was anything in the laws
of nations or our treaties incompatible
with neutrality. 'Having judged that
there was not, he had a right and, if
in his opinion the interests or the
nation required it, it was his duty as
executor or the laws to proclaim the
neutrality of the nation, to exhort
all persons to observe it and warn them
or·the penalties which would attend its
non-observance.'l9
Washington issued the proclamation on April 22,
1'793, and decided to live up to the treaties as well as he
could without involving the United States in a war.
The proclamation read as follows:
Whereas it appears that a state of war
exists between Austria, Prussia., Sardinia,
Great Britain, and the United Netherlands,
of the one part and France on the other; and
the duty and interest of the United States
require, that they should with sincerity
and good faith adopt a conduct friendly
and impartial toward the belligerent Powers:
I have therefore thought fit by these
presents to declare the disposition or the
United States to observe the conduct aforesaid
towards those Powers respectively; and to
exhort and warn the citizens of the United
States carefully to avoid all acts and
proceedings whatsoever, which may in any
manner tend to contravene such disposition.
And I do hereby also make known, that
whosoever of the citizens of the United states
shall render himself liable to punishment or
forfeiture under the laws of nations, by
committing, aiding or abetting hostilities
against any of the said Powers, or by carrying
19 Woodbury, '76.

-18to any of them those artieles which are
deemed contraband by the modern usage of
nations, will not re~eive the protection of the
United States, against such punishment and
forfeiture; and turther, that I have given
instructions to those officers, to whom it
belongs, to cause prosecutions to be instituted against all persons who shall, within
the cognizance ot the courts of the United
states, violate the law of nations, with
respect to the Powers at war, or any of
them •••• 20

The proclamation was not directed to any foreign
government, but to the citizens of the United States as a
warning against aiding any of the belligerents. It also served
as a signal tor America's withdrawal trom Old World politics
based on the balance of power. The document was assailed
throughout the United States, tavored by some, resented by
others.

~~Y

asked why it was not issued in 1792 before Englan

entered the war, rather than issued in 1793 when England became a contestant. Hamilton answered this question by saying
that Austria and Prussia were the main powers in the war, and
they were not maritime powers so neutrality was not needed
until England and Spain, who were maritime powers, entered the
scene. The pro-French group tel t that the proclamation abandoned France when she needed help.
Jefferson telt that Britain should have been made
to pay a price for American neutrality. He expressed this
20

w. MacDonald, (ed.},

Docum.entar~ source Book of American
History, Macmillan co., New Yor , 1926, 244.

>

reeling in a letter to Gouverneur Morris sent on April 20,

1795 from Philadelphia; "Indeed we shall be more useful as
neutrals than as parties by the protection which our !lag will
give to supplies or provision." 21 Jefferson probably intended
that America could supply the French under the cover of neutrality, but England had something else to say about this.
OBJECTIONS TO THE PROCLAMATION

The wording of the proclamation was very clear,
and definitely stated America's position. Nowhere throughout
the document was the word "neutrality" mentioned as suoh. In
a letter to James Madison, Jefferson accounted for this;
The proc,lam (natio) n as first proposed was
to have been a declaration of neutrality.
It was opposed on these grounds. 1. That a
declaration of neutrality was a declaration
there should be no war, to which the Executive
was not competent. 2. That it would be batt~
to hold back the dec [laration] of n (eutrali tyj,
as a thing worth something to the powers at
war, that they would bid tor it, & we might
ask a price, the broadest privileges of
neutral nations. The !st. objection was so
tor respect and as to avoid inserting the
term neutrality & the drawing of the instrument was left to E.R. 22
These, in a summary, were Jefferson's objections to the proclamation.
Hamilton classified the objections to the doou21 W. Ford, (ed.), The Writin~s of Thomas Jefferson, G.P.

Putnam's sons, New York, 1 99, VI, 217.(This will be referred to hereafter as Jefferson-Writings.)

22 Ibid., 315. This letter was sent from Jaokson,Mississippi,

ana-was dated January 23, 1793.

-20-

ment under the following headings: (1) that the proclamation
was without authority; (2) that it was contrary to the treaty
with France; (3) that it was contrary to the gratitude which
was due from America to France; (4} that it was out of time
and unnecessary.
Jefferson's reason for the first objection was:
"··· that the president not having the power to declare war,
had not the power to declare that there should not be war,

~·

to declare a state of neutrality." 23
Hamilton maintained:
If on the one hand the legislature have
a right to declare war, it is, on the other,
the duty of the executive to preserve peace
till the declaration is made; and in fulfilling
this duty, it must necessarily possess a right
ot judging what is the nature of the obligations
which the treaties of the country impose on
the government. 24
The president certainly had the authority to
issue such a document. Neutrality was a necessity at that time
and was founded in the

~itings

of vattel, who was an authority

on international law.
Jefferson's views regarding the violation of the
treaty with France naturally were favorable to that country.
In a letter to the president, he said: "The doctrine then of
23 C. Hynaman, "The First American Nuetralityn, Ill. Studies
in the Social Sciences, University of Illinois, Urbana,
!954, XX, 12.
24 The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Williams and Whiting, New
York, 18l0, III, 322.

-2~
Grotius~

Puttendort, and

vatte~

is that treaties remain

ob~i

gatory notwithstanding any change in the form ot government.n25
Hamilton said:

~This

must be evident when it is considered,

that even to turnish determinate succours to ships or troops,
to a power at war, in consequence of antecedent treaties havin6
no

reference to the existing

partie~~

gsarre~,

is not incon-

sistent with neutra~i ty •••• tt 26 It troops and sh.ips can be
turnished by a

neutra~

and becomes an

al~y

nation, the nation ceases to be

of one O·f the

The newspapers

neutra~,

bel~igerents.

bitter~y

attacked the president

and the proclamation. Most of 'the attacks were by the

pro-Frena~

groups. The French minister., Genet, was very active in the
south at that time, and many groups

ral~ied

to him in the be-

lief that the United States would come to France's aid. Britain
very definitely gained by .America's neutrall ty.
Miss Woodbury sought the reason for the attacks,
and expressed Hamilton's opinion:
It was his [Hamilto~ that the real purpose
of the attacks upon the Neutrality Proclamation in newspapers and pamphlets was not
to bring about a tree discussion ot an tmportant public measure, but to weaken the
confidence of the people in their executive
and thus prepare the way for a successful
opposition. to the government. 27
25~efferson-Writings, 217.

26 Hamilton, 317, the last five words are the author's italics.

27

Woodbury, 73.

'-22Neutrality bore a golden harvest in the carrying
trade of a warring world, and this was especially so until the
British and French decrees closed the seas to American shipping
Thus neutrality paid financially as well as morally. 28

Mr. Thomas presented an interesting view regarding
the opinion of France and England on America's position:
In the estimation of the belligerents
the strength of .America was slight in
comparison to the importance of the
European struggle. Consequently, neither
would have tolerated her neutrality if
it became evident that a neutral policy
would react to the benefit of the opponent.
It was the good fortune of the Washington
administration that, collectively, the
members were able to reoogni~e the strength
of a frankly neutral policy. 29
It was agreed by all nations concerned that the
United states carried out her neutrality very efficiently,
probably too efficiently according to France's opinion. There
were a few instances of failure ·in enforcement of the neutral
principles, but the soundness of the principles prevailed.
During the Administration of President
Washington at least, the ~erioan government furnished its own initiative in
blocking the efforts of American citizens
to enter the war under belligerent colors.
Only on very infrequent occasions did the
British government press the executive to
28 L.Sears, "Jefferson and the Law of Nations", American
Political science Review, waverly Press, Baltimore, XIII,382
29 Thomas, 50.
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investigate or interfere with Genet's
schemes to enlist American unrest and
anti-British feeling directly under
French military and naval command.
The absence of prompting by the British
by no means signifies, however, that
the British government was in doubt,
whether the machinations of Genet and the
response of American citizens were proper
subjects tor diplomatic protest. 30

:Mr. Thomas had this to say: "It was the straight and narrow
course which was

~teared

during the succeeding months that

laid so firmly the foundations of American neutrality and
turnished such an admirable example of neutral conduct to the
world." 31
Even Lord Grenville admitted that the United
states did a splendid job in carrying through her neutrality.
Although from the following quotation one would be inclined to
believe that the United States was not too neutral where
England was concerned:
'With respect to the conduct of the present
Goverlllllent of America His Majesty's I\tlinisters think that there appears to have prevailed in its general tenor a desire for
the maintainenoe of a fair Neutrality and
even a disposition friendly towards this
country. ' 32
According to this America was not "too" neutral if she showed
a friendly disposition towards England.
30 Hynem.an, 142.
31 Thomas, 51.

32 Mayo, 44.

-24-

This chapter will come to a conclusion with this
statement by

again, the proclamation itselr
was not so important as was its execution.~ 33
1~.

3 3 Thomas, 51..

b

Thomas:

~And

CHAPTER II
THE PRINCIPLES OF NEUTRALITY

The first call made upon her was a
crucial. test; for it was made by
England her recent oppressor and
enemy tor protection against the
violation of neutral relations
within her territories by or 1n
behalf of the subjects of France,
her ally and friend, by whom she had
been aided in the war with England,
and towards whom the United States
felt and acknowledged the strongest
obligations. 1
CONTRABAND OF WAR

This chapter will be devoted to the very general
principles of neutrality and how they affected the AngloAmerican relationship.
It became known in England that France was plannin
to receive in payment for America's debt to her, a shipment of
corn in lieu of money. England

~ediately

became worried. Her

position and her future intentions can be noted in Lord
Grenville's instructions to Hammond:
Whitehall, March 12th, 1793

'No. 6

I have great reason to believe, that on principal
Object of Mons. Genet's Mission is to procure a
1

c. Loring, Neutral Relations ot England and the United states,
W.V. Spencer, Boston, 1865, 15.
-25-
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Supply or Corn and Provisions from the states
of America and that for this Purpose he has
been instructed to open a Negotiation with the
American Government for liquidating the Payment
of their loan to France by transmitting to
the Ports ot that eountrr a supply ot corn
and Provisions equal to the amount of the
Outstanding Debt. It will therefore be proper
tor ~ou to use every means in Your power to
ascertain whether any such Negotiation is
going forward •••• It in the result of any
such Negotiation, Provisions and Grain should
be actually shipped on board American Vessels,
on the account ot the Freneft Government they
would evidently be Brench Property, and, as
such, liable to Capture.' 2
Although the United States declined to pay the
debt in this manner, it can be seen how carefully England
watched the American-French relationship. She was certainly
overstepping the bounds of the law of nations by acquiescing
in the opinion that food was contraband of war.
The first British Order in Council was issued as

a result of the above mentioned negotiation. The order was
issued on June 8, 1793, and provided for the detention of all
vessels loaded wholly or in part with corn, flour, or meal
bound to any port in France. Such cargoes could be purchased
on behalf of the English government, or the masters of suCh
ships might be permitted, on giving due security to dispose ot
their cargoes in the ports of any country in amity with England
2 Mayo, 37.
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rn this way England maintained that the owner of such provisions would be paid for his goods.
Grenville justified this legislation by the
following letter to Hammond, a part of which is quoted here:
'No. 8

Whitehall, 5th

J~ly,

1'193

In Your Communication on this subject
provisions being contraband You will not
fail to remark that by the L @.w)of Nations,
particularly by the most modern writers particularly by vattel,,it is expressly stated
that all provisions are to be considered as
.Article.s of Contraband, and as such liable to
confiscation ih the case where depriving an
Enemy of these supplies is one of the means
intended to be employed for reducing him to
reasonable terms.' 3
If England was so willing to accept the opinion
of the modern writers on the law of nations for this principle,
why did she not agree to the principle-"free ships-free goods"?
This certainly was a modern principle, but England refused to
recognize it. She only accepted the modern rules that aided
her. Other European countries accepted this principle, and it
was included in America's treaties with these countries.

Mr. Lyman phrased England's so-called authority
for issuing such an edict in this way:

~The

authority of

England is, therefore, in itself sufficient to prove that provisions are not rigidly contraband by conventional law."
3 ~., 41.
4

Lyman, 179.

4
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The Unit.ed States continued to trade in contraband,
although the risk of seizure followed every ship. washington
did not forbid the export of contraband goods and this must be
recognized as a very significant feature of the first American
neutrality. Jefferson also stated "••• that the United States
would take no steps to interrupt the contraband trade of its
citizens, and that it would interpose no objection to the confis
cation of contraband by the belligerent powers." 5
The writings of vattel authorized the trading in
contraband:
In both sections cited (llO and ll3 vattel)
the rights of neutrals to trade in articles
contraband of war is clearly established; in
the first, by selling to the warring powers
who come to the neutral country to buy them;
in the second, by the neutral subjects or
citizens carrying them to the countries of
the powers at war and there selling them. 6
In a letter to Mr. Pinckney, Jefferson condemned
the British ord.er :
This article is so manifestly contrary
to the law of nations that nothing more
would seam necessary than to observe that
it is so. Reason and usage have established
that when two nations go to war, those who
chuse to live in peace, retain their natural
right to pursue their agriculture, manufactures,
and other ordinary vocations; to carry the
produce of their industry, for exchange, to
5

c.

Hyneman, 146.

6 H. Lodge, War Addresses 1915-1917, Houghton Mifflin co.,
Boston, 1917, 124.
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all nations belligerent or neutral as usual;
to go and come freely, without injury or
molestation; and, in short, that the war
among others shall be, for than, as if it
di~ not exist •. SDoes not cite an authoity for
this statement~
·
It suffices, tor the present occasion to
say, that corn, flour, and meal, are not of
the class of contraband and consequently remain
articles of free commerce.
The state of war then existing between
Great Britain and France, furnishes no legitimate
right to either interrupt the agriculture of
the United States, or the peaceable exchange
of its produce with all nations; and consequently
the assumption of it will be as lawful hereafter
as now:, in peace as in war ••••
This act too, tends directly to draw us
from that state of peace, in which we are
wishing to remain. If we permit corn to be sent
to Great Britain and her friends, we are equally
bound to permit it to France. To restrain it
would be a partiality which might lead to war
with France; and, between restraining it
ourselves, and permitting her enemies to
restrain it unrightfully, is no difference. 7
.Jefferson was right in his opinions. In the estimation of this
writer, food as contraband of war cannot ethically be defended.
For a more thorough study of this question see Chapter

v.

One of the articles of the order provided that
armed vessels ot Great Britain seize tor condemnation, vessels
entering a blockaded port for the first time. The ships of
Denmark and sweden were excepted. The reason for this exception
being that " existing treaties with these powers; cannot,
7 Documents .Accompanain~ A Messafe of the President of the
'Ctnited states, A.&. iay, Wash ngton, 18o6, 4-6.
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therefore, give any just grounds of umbrage or jealousy to
other powers; between whom and Great Britain no such treaties
subsist.tt 8 Jefferson felt that this was practically stating
that vessels of the United states were lawful prize, and those
of Denmark and Sweden were not.
Jefferson stood for the agricultural interests of
the country, and this order naturally harmed the agrarian
interests. In a letter to Hammond, he set forth his arguments:
Certainly none was ever more so than the
instruction in question, as it strikes at
the root of our agriculture, and at the
means of obtaining for our citizens in
general, the humerous articles ot necessity
and comfort which they do not make for
themselves, but have hitherto procured
from other nations by exchange." 9
After this bit of legislation by Britain, the
Uni t_ed States naturally wanted to pass retaliatory measures.
The last report of Jefferson on the Commercial Privileges and
Restrictions was made the basis for Madison's reintroduction
of his famous resolutions on January 3, 1794, placing restrictions upon British goods and vessels. Once again the
measures were not passed.
FREE SHIPS-FREE GOODS

Because Britain had blockaded France (paper block-

-31ade), she could not get her goods from the French West Indies,
thus she opened the French West India trade to the United
states ( some authors believe before the war). The United
states could carry the produce directly from the islands to
France. France was "&itting around" the British blockade.
Britain issued another Order in Order in Council
in November 6, 1793. This

ord~

provided tor the seizure of

all ships laden with goods that were the produce of any colony
belonging to France. It also prohibited the carrying of provisions or other supplies f'or the use of any such col.ony.
Britain held that by the Rule of 1756, trade closed to neutrals
in time of peace could not be opened in time of' war. It denied
to America the direct trade between their ports, the FrenCh
islands, and France. Even the Federalists denounced it.
This also was a repudiation of the principle that
"free ships make tree goods". Jefferson viewed this principle
as follows:
It cannot be denied that according to
the general law of nations, the goods
of an enemy are lawful prize in the
bottom of a friend, and the goods ot
a friend privileged in the bottom of
an enemy; or in other words, that the
goods follow the owner. The inconvenience
of this principle in subj eating neutral
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vessels to vexatious searches at sea,
has for more than a century rendered
it usual for nations to substitute a
conventional principle that the goods
shall follow the bottom, instead of
the natural one before mentioned. 10
By adhering to this principle the United States
was not gaining anything for herself and was really losing;
for French goods were being protected by America's flag. In a
letter to the French minister, Jefferaon expounded this view:
Indeed we are the losers in every direclion
of that principle [free ships-free goods for
when it works in our favor, it is to sa e
the goods of our friends, when it works
against us, it is to lose our own, and we
shall continue to lose while the rule is
only partially established. When we shall
have established it with all nations we
shall be in a condition neither to gain nor
lose, but shall be less exposed to vexatious
searches at sea. To this condition we are
endeavoring to advance, but as it depends
on the will of other nations as well as
our own, we can only obtain it when they
shall be ready to concur. 11
Grenville refused to commit England to a recognition of this new principle. In a letter to Hammond he gave
England's stand:
'It is indeed necessary to state on
this occasion that the Principle of
free Ships making free Goods, is one which
never has been recognized by this
Country and that it undoubtedly
10

s. Padover, The Com!lete Jefferson, Duell, Sloan
Inc., New York, 194 , 221.

11 Jefferson- Writings, 35?.

&.
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not be

al~owed

in the present case. 12

The order was delayed being put into execution
until December, so that British armed

vesse~s

would have time

to get to the islands and seize the American ships there
without warning. Britain did seize about 250

vesse~s,

and the

vice admiralty ot the West Indies condemned about 150 of them.
To say that this was the worst

possib~e

order

that England could have issued at that time, would be a mild
understatement {litotes). England was practically asking for
war by attempting to regulate American trade.
After ·a
her unyielding

whi~e

po~icy.

Britain

rea~ized

the harshness of

On January 8, 1794, another order was

forthcoming. This order modified the order of November by
permitting direct trade between the French West Indies and the
United states, in goods that were non-contraband of war. Ships
could bring products from the West Indies to America, pay the
duties, and then export them to Europe. This was trading indirectly with France.

ARMING OF PRIVATEERS
Another principle of neutrality which England opposed was the fitting out of privateers trom neutral ports.·
12 Mayo, 37-38.
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France was granted this privilege in America (by treaty), while
this same privilege was to be denied to France's enemies (which
at the time happened to be England). With the issuance ot the
proclamation ot neutrality, France was not permitted to arm her
privateers in American ports. A neutral nation has no right to
make its ports a base of hostile operations for one belligerent
against another. Mr. Thomas stated that •The neutral duty of
the United States extended to the use of her porta as surely
as it extended to the use of her iron and wood." 13
The United States restored or indemnified any
prizes that were seized by privateers which were outfitted in
the United States without the knowledge of the federal government. By so doing, America displayed her honest efforts to
maintain her neutrality.
Prizes which had been taken by such
privateers fitted out, and sailing
trom ports, in the United states, were
restored to the British owners; and the
Government of the United states proclaimed,
that it held itself responsible to indemnify
for such captures. 14
SEARCHES AND IMPRESSMENT

Both sides agreed that a belligerent ship might
visit and search a neutral merchantman. As to the extent ot
the search there was disagreement. If the ship's papers did
13 Thomas, 145.
14 Loring, 16.
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not convince the officer in charge of the search as to the
nature of the cargo, a search was necessary, so said Britain.
The United States contended that an examination of the ship's
papers was sufficient. In case of a suspected ship with fraudulent papers, a search might be ordered.
The United States, while freely admitting
the belligerent right of search, denied
that it might be employed tor any but the
acknowledged purposes of enforcing blockades,
seizing priae goods, and perhaps·oapturing
officers and soldiers in the actual service
of the enemy. 15
'rhere were two categories relative to neutrality,
the first was that relating to the enforcement of neutrality
within America's own territory and waters; the second pertained
to neutral rights of the United States on the high seas.
Many times the searching party used the pretense
of search as a means of impressing seamen into the Royal Navy.
Although this was a. practice at that time, it was not practiced
to any great extent until the period prior to the War of 1812.
Britain was not always too careful to ascertain
without a doubt the nationality of the seamen involved, consequently many American seamen were impressed. An .American had
a chance of being returned, but an Englishman, who had become
a naturalized Jmerican, had no chance of being sent back to
America, for Britain believed that

~once

an Englishman- always

15 J.B.Moore, The Principles of American Diplomacy, Harper &
Brothers, New York, 1918, 113.

-36-

an Englishman".
All of the British attacks on American commerce
paved the way for

reta~ia'OO.ry

measures. These various acts

passed by England aroused the public in America, thus somethin
had to be done. This something was the American Embargo passed
March 26, 1794. by Congress.• This provided that all vessels in
American ports that were bound for a foreign port were forbidden to leave.

On

April 18, it was extended for another

month.
The terms of the embargo were made very
and were

seeming~y

genera~,

aimed at foreign commerce, but they were

aimed specifically at Britain • .America was still afraid to
antagonize Britain, for America was not prepared tor war, and
war at that time would have meant a victory for Britain.
The Federalists thought that by sending an envoy
to England, to settle amicably the differences between the
two countries, would be the best course of action. So John Jay
was chosen to carry forth this difficult task.
This chapter can be summed up by using a splendid
quotation taken from Mr. Foster:
It is now plain that the neutrality
proclamation of the President was a
most wise and necessary act- one ot
the most important in the history of
the country, as it was the inauguration
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of a principle of international
governmental practice which ha·s
us the respect of the world and
very materially to our national

law and
won for
contributed
prosperity. 16

16 J. Foster, A Century of American Diplomacy, Houghton Miffli
Co.~ Boston, 1900, 157.

CHAPTER III
J"AY'S MISSION
In order to avert the impending crisis
Washington finally decided to send an
envoy extraordinary to England and to
endeavor to hold congress in cheak
until another effort at negotiation
should be fulfilled. 1

J"AY'S APPOINTMENT
Messers Cabot, King, Ellsworth, and strong, all
staunch Federalists, decided that a special envoy should be
sent to the Court ot
ois1~

st. :James. These men brought their de-

to the president, who agreed that an envoy should be

sent. washington immediately thought of Hamilton. one can imagine the protests. that were raised when Hamilton's name was
mentioned for such a mission. Because of his pro-British
feelings it was felt that he would grant concessions to England
The whole idea of the mission was scorned by the Republican
group.
The whole project of a mission was
bitterly assailed by all ~epublioans
and many Federalists. Furthermore,
Washington had unerringly divined
the weakness of Hamilton in the role
of envoy to England. The proposal to
1 J".H.Latane and D. Wainhouse, A History of American Foreign
Policy. Odyssey Press, New York, 1940, 9o.
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-39to nominate him raised such a storm
of protest that finally it became
evident that from a political
standpoint, his appointment was impossible. 2
John Jay's name was then recommended. Jay did not
receive the whole-hearted support of the people. Since Jay was
oneof the negotiators of the Treaty of 1783, he was thought to
be well qualified tor such a mission. But his attitudes and
pro-BritiSh opinions, then, were still in the minds ot the
people.
On the surface, Jay's indifference to the
navigation of the Mississippi, his mythical
monarch~al principles, his attachment to
England and aversion to France, appeared
explanatory of the hostility. 3
REASONS FOR OPPOSITION
It was thought unnecessary and inexpedient to
send a special envoy to England when Thomas Pinckney was there
as a representative of the American government.
Jay was disfavored because he was Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court. A chief justice, it was said, should not
be sent to make a treaty which might later come up tor his
judicial review. This argument does not seem very plausible,
for if Jay were qualified for the mission, he could have resigned trom the bench. The country should not be denied the
2 R. Hayden, The senate and Treaties 1789-1817, Macmillan co.,
New York, 1920, 65.
3

c.

Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton, 249.
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opportunity of sending a

capab~e

representative. This was just

a ruse to cover up the real reason for the opposition.
The real opposition was centered about Jay's
beliefs and opinions. Mr. Bowers felt that "••• third, that
John Jay held opinions against the interest and just claims of
his country which rendered it unwise to entrust to him the
task of securing justice from Great Britain." 4
Jay himself was reluctant to accept the mission.
In a

~etter

to his wife he expressed himself very clearly.

since this letter was intended to be his private correspondence
with no thought of its being published, it can be regarded as
authoritative. To his wife, too, he would express his true
feelings.
This is not my seeking; on the contrary
I regard it as a measure not to be desired
but to be submitted to:
If it should p~ease God to make me
instruments~ to the continuance of peace,
and in preventing the eftusion of blood,
and other evils and miseries incident to
war, we sh~l both have reason to rejoice. 5
And in another letter to his wife on April

~9,

he said:

so far as I am personally concerned,
my feelings are very, very far from
exciting wishes for its taking place.
No appointment ever operated more
unpleasant~y upon me; but the public
4 Ibid., 70.
5 Correspondence and Public Papers of John Ja!, ed. by H.
Johnston, G.P. PUtnam's Sons, New York, 189 , IY, 4. This
letter was written from Philadelphia, April 15, 1794.
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considerations which were urged, and the
manner in which it was pressed, strongly
impressed me with a conviction that to
refuse it would be to desert my duty for
the sake of my ease and domestic concerns
and comforts. 6
Jay took his mission seriously, and honestly
thought he would be helping his country. It cannot be said
that he was idealistic in his suppositions. He considered it
his duty to accept the commission without thought to his
personal gains.
The Senate

oonfi~ed

his nomination on April 19,

1794.

It therefore was not Alexander Hamilton,
Secretary of Treasury, but John Jay, Chief
Justice of the United States, who set sail
on May 12, 1794, assured that washington's
administration would nQt permit his negotiations in London to be hampered by the
measures before Congress for sequestering
debts due to British creditors and for
commercial nonintercourse until Britain
should compensate American shippers, pay
for the Negroes, and evacuate the Northwest
posts. But it took the deciding vote of
Vice President J'ohn Adams in the senate to
defeat the non importation bill ot the
Jeffersonians. 7
A very important principle ot neutrality was that

a neutral was not permitted to negotiate a treaty with a
belligerent. When a new treaty with France was urged, it was
6 Ibid., 5.
7 A.B. Darling, our Rising Empire 1763-1803, Yale University

Press, New Haven, 1940;1'18.

-42agreed that a neutral could not consummate a treaty with one
of the belligerents in a war. Yet Jay was appointed tor the
express purpose of concluding a treaty with England, who waa
a belligerent. In a strict interpretation of this principle,
Jay's mission, then, was very definitely a violation of the
neutrality tha.t .America proclaimed. Mr. Hyneman stated:
"Consequently it may be argued that all treaty relations
between neutrals and belligerents should remain frozen during
period of war."

8

JAY'S INSTRUCTIONS

Although Jay's instructions were drafted by
Randolph, Secretary of state, they were a reflection ot
Hamilton's views. Hamilton, at the time, accepted the BritiSh
Orders in Council, and by so doing departed from America's
previous treaties. He also acquiesced in the principles that
food was contraband of war, the seizure of enemy property in
the bottom of a neutral, and the Rule ot 175~.
In short, Hamilton and the Federalists,
with scant consideration tor the previous
attitude of the nation in treati~s with
European powers [F:ranctil would accede to all
British contentions - detention and preemption of foodstuffs, Rule of 1755, capture
ot enemy property on neutral Ships - provided some compensations were made tor the
8 Hyneman, 42.
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for ~he extreme interaretation and harsh
application of the Or er of November 6.
To get admission to the British West Indies
they would consent to bind the united states
not to raise the tariff on BritiSh goods
during a term of years beyond a fixed ratio. 9
Jay was given discretionary powers, and received
only two restrictions. The extent of his powers has never
been equalled by any envoy since that time.
The envoy discussed the whole subject of the
treaty freely with Hamilton, King and other Federalists. He
knew just how far he would be supported if he judged any devi10
ation from his instructions necessary.
This was especially
so if he had to relinquish a part ot his instructions in order
to gain other points.
Jay's official instructions did not of
direct him to surrend~ these
\!D-Odernj principle [Of neutrali tyJ, but he
was given a wide discretion, and Hamilton's
views as reported by H~ond to his
superiors governed the negotiations. 11
~ourse

Jay was instructed t.o obtain the following:
••• To keep alive in the mind of the
British Minister that opinion which the
solemnity ot a special mission must
naturally inapiJ:_e. of the strong agitations
excited in the people of the United states,
by the disturbed condition of things
between them and Great Britain; to repel
!!£ 1 for which we are not disposed, and
212.

1785-1929),
11Latane and Wainhouse, 90.
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into which the necessity of vindicating our
honor and our property may, but can alone,
drive us; to prevent the British ministry,
should they be resolved on war, from carrying
with thwn the British nation; and, at the
same time, to assert, with dignity and
firmness, our rights, and our title to
reparation tor past injuries.
Compensation for all the injuries sustained,
and captures, will be strenuously pressed by you.
If the British ministry should hint at any
supposed predilection in the United States for
the French nation, as warranting the whole or
any part of these instructions, you will stop
the progress of this subject, as being irrelative to the question in hand.
II. A second cause ot your mission, but not
inferior in dignity to the preceding, though
subsequent in order, is to draw to a conelusion all points of difference between the
United states and Great Britain, concerning
the treaty of peace.
III. It is referred to your discretion
whether, in ease the two preceding points should
'Qe so a-9~omodated as to promise the continuance
of tranquility between the United States and
Great Britain, the subject of a commercial
t~eaty may be listened to by you, or even
broken to the British ministry.
No stipula.tion, whatsoever is to interfere
with out obligations to France.
A treaty is not to continue beyond fifteen
years.
IV. This enumeration presents generally
the objects which it is desirable to comprise
in a commercial treaty; not that it is
expected that one can be effected with so
great a latitude of advantages.
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If to the actual footing of our commerce
and navigation in the British European
dominions cou+d be added the privileges
of carrying directly from the United States
to the British West Indies in our own
bottoms generally, or of certain defined
burthens ••• this would afford an acceptable
basis of a treaty for the term not exceeding
fifteen years; and it would be advisable
to conclude a treaty upon that basis.
You will have no difficulty in gaining
access to the ministers of Russia, Denmark,
and Sweden, at the Court of London. The
principles of the armed neutrality would
abundantly cover our neutral rights. If,
therefore, the situation of things with
respect to Great Britain should dictate
the necessity of taking the precaution of
foreign co-operation upon his head ••• and
if an entire view of all our political
relations shall, in your judgment, permit
the step, you will sound those ministers
upon the probability of an alliance with
their nations to ·support those principles.
VI. such are the outlines of the conduct
which the President wishes you to pursue.
He is aware that, at this distance, and
during the present instability of public
events, he cannot undertake to prescribe
rules which shall be irrevocable. You will
therefore consider the ideas herein expressed
as ~ounting to recommendations only, which
in your discretion you may modity as seems
most beneficial to the United SU&tes, except
in the two following cases which are immutable
•••• you will inform them that the Government
of the United States will not derogate from
our treaties and engagmnents with France, and
that experience has shown that we can be
honewt in our duties to the British nation
without laying ourselves under any particular
restraints as to other nations; and second
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that no treaty of commerce be included
or signed contrary to the foregoing
prohibition. 12
Jay was limited in only two points regarding the
treaty with France and the commercial restriction. It will be
noted that Jay was authoriaed to ask for the opening of the
British West Indies on condition that the tonnage be limited.
Yet when this article in the treaty was known, it was violently
protested. Jay, however, was acting under orders.
SUMMARY
~~.

Payne stated: "England was more willing to

negotiate with Jay than with Adams, because Jay was more easily
bent to her designs and because France, with whom she was at
war, was beginning to gather strength. The ardor for another
war cooled, only tor these selfish reasons.~ 13
The administration hoped

~hat

some of the diffi-

culties with England would be reconciled by this mission. It
was also desired that this reconciliation could be brought
about without compromising America's neutrality with France.
America could not draw nearer

to France without pulling

herself into hostile relations with England - a position which
14
the interests of the country forbade it to take.
12 Johnston, 11-20.
13 Payne, 31.
14 w.H. Trescott, The Diplomatic History of the Administrations

of washington and Adams, Little Brown & co., Boston, 1857",
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CHAPTER IV
GRIEVANCES t NEGOTIATIONS AND SETTLEMENTS

Vital national questions entered into the
negotiations of Jay's treaty. The surrender
by the Britiah of the frontier posts affected
our· relatiolis with the Indian population
on our Northern border; the boundary question
involved the extent of the Republic, the
navigation regulations bore directly upon
occupations in which American capital was
invested and in which thousands of Americans
earned their living; to define contraband
affected large groups of producers. European
internatio~al relations, British internal
polities, American politics, the strength
and adaptability of the American Governm~t
were a~l involved in the events leading up
to the negotiation or tne treaty, in the
negotiation itsel~, in the ratification
and the enforcement of the treaty. 1
POSTS

The various grievances, British retention or the
posts; non-payment of debts due British subjects; taking of
the negroes with the

evacu~tion

of New York by the British;

that Jay was instructed to settle dated back to the Treaty of
Paris in 1783. Both countries violated the treaty, but it was
a perplexing question to decide whieh country violated it
first.
Jefferson believed that since Britain violated
the treaty first, the United states could legally violate it
1 Bemis, Introduction.
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Britain believed that the United States was the first

vio~ator.

In international

~aw

there was no court to whieh a

country would have access in order to settle such a matter
as this. Naturally the discussions over this question were
carried over a period of years. If one party to a contract
abrogated it, the other party would be justified in violating
it too.
Jay's belief was contrary to this, however:
we establish the principle', he wrote,
'that we have a right to depart from the
treaty in one article, because they have
departed from it ~n another, they will
certainly avail themselves of the same
principle; and probably extend it furthe~.' 2

'It

Oliver Wolcott, writing under the pseudonym
WMareustt, stated this view:
Neither Great Britain nor the United States
have ever aamitted that they were guilty ot
the first infraction. It is, however, certain,
that at length the Treaty was infraoted by
both parties; and that the first infraction
on the part of the United States was committed
by the state of Virginia. 3
Professor

McLau~in

held that •Both countries violated the

treaty anQ.practically simultaneously- America by the acts
against the loyalists and against the recovery of debts,
England by the retention of the posts
2

3

~nd

the transportation

Channing, 136.

o. Wolcott, British Influence on the Affairs of the Unit~~
States Proved and ~lained, Young and Minis, Boston, 1804,
5.(This author blam~ wverything on the state of Virginia.)
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of negroes." 4 This seened to be the most logical solution to
thei question.
DATES FOR CLARITY
Some dates that will aid in making the situation
a trifle clearer were given by Professor Channing. The document to cease hostilities was signed by America on February
14, 1783, and by Britain, February 27, 1783. Hostilities
actually ceased in April of 1785. The Treaty of Paris was
signed September 3, 1783, and ratified by congress, January
14, 1784, and by Britain, April 9, 1784. Ratifications were
exchanged at Paris on Iviay 12, 1784.. From this date then the
treaty became a binding compact.

on this very same day,

Ha1dimand, speaking for Britain, stated that the posts would
not be given up until there was some agreement about the loyalists in

~erica.

The

necea~ary

legislation tor carrying this

treaty into effect was passed By Congress on May 30, 1783.
Britain evacuated New York, carrying with her about 5000 ..negro
slaves, on November 25, 1783. At that time the t-reaty was not
a binding agreement.

5

JEFFERSON .AND HAMILTON'S VIEWS ON DEBTS
Jefferson

wa~

of the opinion that the treaty was

4 A. McLaughiin, .,"The Western Posts and the British Debts",
American Historical Association, Annual Retort, United
states Printing Office, Washington, 1895, 21.
5 Channing, et. passim.
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violated in England before it was known in America, and in
America as soon as it was known. England violated it by the
acts of her commanders at the evacuation of New York.
Since the individual states did not comply with
the Congressional legislation ( tor carrying the treaty into
e:f':f'ect.) immediately, England used this as a basis tor her
arguments in the retention of the posts.
Whatever may have been the original reason
for their retention, a convenient excuse
for holding the,posts soon arose when it
became evident that the weak American
Confederation was powerless to restrain
individual states from putting obstacles
in the way of the collection of British
debts guaran~eed by the treaty. This was
an ex post facto excuse, as we know, but
a strong one. 6
A change of' government in the interim affected the acts of the
states.
As soon as Hammond arrived in the United states
he sent a letter to Jefferson enmnerating Britain's

grie~anoes,

and in this he was following Grenville's instructions. 7
'If President asks about Posts and Forts You are to say that His Majesty would have
restored these Posts and Forts immediately
after the Ratification ot the beforamentioned
Treaty, it the said States had complied
with the Fourth and Fifth Articles of' the
said Treaty in favour ·or British Creditors;
6 Bemis, 10 ..
7 This letter was published in A.S.P.F.R., but was too long
to quote.
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And that His Majesty can never think of
restoring the said Posts and Forts, until
those Articles are fully complied with.' 8
Hammond was on very friendly terms with Hamilton.
This was important in considering the relationship between the
three men, Jefferson, Hamilton and Hammond. Jefferson submitted
an abstract of his reply to Hammond to Hamilton for examination.
Hamilton in turn reiterated Jefferson's argmnents to Hammond.
Something which a man of the Virginian's
temperment certainly never would have done
had he known that practically every argument
so strongly made therein had already been
neutralized by his colleague 1n confidential
oral negotiations with the British Minister. 9
Hamilton cannot be excused tor such conduct.

Mr. Latane spoke of his actions in this manner: "He was willing
to sacrifice everyone and everything to maintain peace with
England. This explains his attitude towards Jefferson and his
interference with the negotiations of his colleague through
secret conferences with Hammond."

10

Jefferson's arguments were far superior to Hammond
He cited cases where every state law that was contrary to the
treaty of peace (and specificallymeant the laws regarding
the collection of debts) had been revoked except in South
Carolina. The law in this state affected the natives as well as
8 Mayo, Vol. III, 9.
9 Bemis, 106.

lOJ.H. Latane and D. Wainhouse, 77.
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the British •
••• that the recovery of debts was
obstructed validly in none ot the
states, and invalid!! only in a
few; and that not ti 1 long after
the infractions on the other side. 11
JAY'S VIEWPOINTS
In a letter to Randolph sent during the negotiations, Jay stated the British cause:
••• that, therefore, it was not until
the end of May, 17~, that Great Britain
was bound to give any orders to evacuate
the posts; that suCh orders could not
arrive at Q.uebec, until in July, 1784; and,
consequently, that the allegation of a breach
or the treaty by the non-execution of the
article respecting the posts, grounded on
circumstances prior to the 13th July, 1764,
are evidently unfounded; that, in the
interval between the arrival and publication
in America, of the provisional articles, and
at the month of July 1784, by which time, at
soonest, orders {issued after the exchange of
ratifications of the treaty of peace, the
last of !~y) could reach Quebec, incontestible
violations of the treaty h.ad taken place in
theUni ted Sta te·s •••• That in opposition to
this, new legislative ac'&.s had, in the interval
before mentioned, been passed, which were
evidently calculated to be beforehand with
the treaty, and to prevent its having its
full ana fair operation on certain points and
objects, when it should be ratified and take
effect; that these acts were the first
violation of the treaty, and justified Great
Britain in detaining the posts until the
injuries caused by their operation should be
compensated.
11 Wolcott, 18.

.

'

That Great Britain was not bound
to evacuate the posts, nor to give any
orders for the purpose, until after the
exchange of ratifications, does appear
to me a proposition that cannot be
reasonably disputed. 12
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.Jay's points here were very logical. The British
did not have to give orders for the evacuation until after the
tatification of the treaty by both sides, which took place in
May of 1784. Naturally the British had a good argument in this,
and it was a very good method for retaining the posts.
HISTORIANS ' VIEWS

Dr. McLaughlin viewed the posts in this way:
From the formation of the new Govermaent
England was without valid excuse tor
retention on the old ground. At least her
merchants were called upon to make use of
the courts offered her, or all pretense
at retaliation was assumption and unjustified
intrusion on our rights. 13

\

Professor Bemis maintained that the British maintained the posts for economic reasons: uThe real reason tor thi
'settl~

policy to refuse delivery of the posts, notwithstandi

the terms of the treaty,t lies in the fur trade, at that time
the greatest and most profitable single industry in North
I

America." 14
There can be no 4oubt that Britain held on to the
12 Public Papers of .John .Jay, 63.
13 McLaughlin, 122.
14

Bemis, 5.
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posts for the lucrative fur trade, and also in the hopes ot
building a neutral buffer state between America and canada.

Mr.

Burt disproved this theory by stating that such suspicions

were the operation of prejudice. Although it was

lo~g

accepted

by the United states, it was never proved.
According to their own estimates, London
imported annually from canada furs worth
two hundred thousand pounds, ot which
nearly two-thirds came from the American
·side of the line, and the commercial debt
of the whole interior was three hundred
thousand pounds. We may therefore conclude
that two-thirds of th.i s am.oUl'lt, or two
hundred thousand pounds, was owing from
American t~ritory. 15
To conclude, the private gain was as dust
in the balance compared with the public
loss. From a purely business standpoint
it was Britain's interest to deliver the
posts to the Americans as soon as possible,
if only the fur trade were taken into account.
Therefore we must seek other reaaons for
Britain's violation of the treaty. The
indefinite retention ot the posts was due
primarily to a British blunder and secondarily
to an American weakness.· 15
All of the negotiations between Jay and Grenville
were oral, and thus were not recorded anywhere. The drafts of
the treaty, one by Jay and the other by Grenville, were found
in the archives of London.
15 A.L. Burt, The United States . Great Britain and British
North America, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1940, 84.
lo Ibid., 85.
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The draft of the treaty by Jay called for the
evacuation of the posts by June of 1795. Grenville wanted June
of 1796. As the article stood in the final treaty, the posts
were to be evacuated in 1796. Here Jay gave in to Grenville.
Article II. His Majesty will withdraw
all his troops and garrisons from all
posts and places within the bGundary
lines assigned by the treaty of peace
to the United States. This evacuation
shall take place on or before the first
day of June, one thousand seven hundred
and ninety six•••• 17

Mr. Mowat by stating: ttJay, by getting these most
valuable fur-trading posts, reaped where the very able American
negotiators of 1782 had sown, tor the best posts were on the
American side of the line." 18 thus admit~ed England's reason

tor holding onto the posts.
D~TS

Since most of the debts due to the British were
in the South, it was from this section that most ot the opposition to their payment was made. Most of the debts were due
to commercial

hou~es.

The United States did not want to pay

the interest on the debts during the war, because this was not
expressly stipulated by the treaty of peace.
17 J. Elliot, The American Diplomatic Code, Jonathan Eliot Jr.t

Washington,

l8~,·242.

18 R.Mowat, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and
Great Britain, E. Arnold&. co., London, 1925, 214.
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million dollars.
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19
Virginia's debts far exceeded all of the other states. This was
the reason for the strong opposition to the payment of the
debts.
The debts were to be settled in this manner:
Article Vt. ••• It is agreed, th~t in all
' such cases, where tull compensation tor
such losses, cannot, for whatever reason,
be actually obtained, had and received by
the said creditors in the ordinary course
of justice, the United States will make
full and complete compensation for the same
to the said creditors •••• For the purpose
of ascertaining the amount of any sueh
losses and damages, five Commissioners
shall be appointed and authorized to
meet and act in manner following •••• 20
After the provisions of the treaty became known,
two writers Deeius (who opposed it) and Camillus (in reality
Hamilton and King- favored it} discussed this particular
article in the followin&,Decius said:

19 Wolcott, 12.
20 Bemis, 326-329.
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The mode of adjusting t.he sum due to
British creditors, agreeab~y to the
sixth article, wil~ be unjust towards
these states which have interposed no
lawfu~ impediments in the way of
recovering such debts, as they must
also bear part of the burden, and
thus suffer the delinquency of others. 21
Deoius was correct in this argument, for the taxpaying people,
whether they owed debts to the British or not, would be further
taxed to pay these

ob~igations.

Who

wou~d

the debt? The merchant, who had already

have to help discharg

~o.st

his property; the

farmer, who had nothing to do in contracting the debt, yet he
would be called upon to pay by means of a land tax. Deeius
a~so

felt that the matter should be left to the

Americ~

courts

rather than put a stigma on the United states.
Regarding the use of the commissioners to
the controversy, Camillus viewed it

sett~e

thus~y:

Let it be remembered, the government of
Great Britain has to consult the interests
and opinions of its citizens, as wel~ as
the government of the United States those
of its citizens. The only satisfactory
course which the former could pursue,
in reference to its merchants, was to
turn over the whole question of interest
as we~l as the principa~ to the commissioners.
And as this was truly equitable, the government of the United States could make no
well-founded opposition to it. 22
2

~ American Remem.brano.er, printed by Henry Tuckniss for Mathew

Carey, Philadelphia, October
22 The Works of Alexander

~o, ~795,

H&md~ton,

295.

II,

~22.
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The United States also had claims upon the British

tor illegal seizure and condemnation of American vessels in
the West Indies as a result of the British orders in Counc11.
Jay was also instructed to seek indemnification for than.
This matter was to be settled by arbitration, as
provided tor in article seven:
Article VII - That for the purpose of
ascertaining the amount of any such
losses and damages, five Commissioners
shall be appointed and authorized to act
in London. 23
This article was to be reciprocal, however, for it provided in
addition to the above, the following:
And whereas certain merchants and others
of his Majesty's subjects, complain, that
in the course of the war they have sustained
loss and damage, by reason of the eapture
of their vessels and merchandise, taken
within the limits and jurisdiction of the
states, and brought into the ports of the
same, or taken by vessels originally armed
in ports of said states.
It is agreed tliat in al.l such cases
where restitution shall not have been made
agreeably to the tenor of the letter from
Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Hammond, ••• 'he
complaints of the parties shall be and
hereby are referred to the commissioners
to be authorized and required to proeeed
in the like manner relative to these as to
the other cases committed to them •••• 24
23 Bemis, 326-329.

24 MacDonald, 250.
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Thus England was to ahara in compensation along
with t.he United States, -·and the very tact that the commissioners were to meet in London {the fifth commissioner could easily
be an Englishman) revealed the onesidedness of this article.
Camillus showed that the 1atter part of the article could be
used to America's advantage: "TWo characters are made essential
to the cases in which the compensation is to be made; one, that
the prizes were brought within our ports - the other, that we
torebore to use all the means in our power to restore them." 25
~ust

how this could be used to America's advantage was a

questionable matter. Camillus further stated that damages by
capture~,

which were not followed by condemnations, were pro-

vided for as well as those where condemnations followed. He sai
that America could not aSk Britain to pay tor seizures

~til

it

was fairly ascertained what was to be paid, especially when she
suspected that a good proportion ot the property might turn out
to be French - not when she was in a position to dictate.
In

these two articles, arbitration was adopted tor

the first time in history.
'His Britannic Majesty shall, with all
consistent speed and without causing
25 Hamilton, 309.
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any destruction or carrying away any
negroes or other property ot the American
inhabitants, withdraw all his armies,
garrisons, and fleets trom the said United
States, and from every port, place and
harbor within the same.' 26
The wording of this article was very ambiguous,
tor it did not state exactly which negroes were meant - whethe
the negroes that were

wi~hin

the British lines prior to the

time of the treaty were meant, or those who came into British
hands after the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged,
was not definitely stated. With such ambiguity, it was difficult for Jay to have legal grounds to uphold the claims for
indemnification of the slaves carried off at the evacuation of
New York in November of 1783.
Professor Ogg concluded that the British were
forbidden to carry away the slaves after the signing of the
treaty {September 3, 1783). It seemed to the writer that the
treaty would be binding when it was ratified by both countries.
This date was May 12, 1784, consequently Britain had not violated the treaty •
• • • that the British were forbidden to
carry away only such negroes as had come
into their possession after the signing
of the treaty at Paris, and that in the
disposal of those within their lines at
26 F. Ogg, "Jay's Treaty and the Slavery Interests of the
United States-, American Historical Association, Annual
Report for t~e year 1901, United Sta~es Government Printing
Office, Wash1ngtan, 1902, I, 275. Thls article was a part
of the Treaty of Paris.
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that tim..e they were left -entirely
without restriction. 27
Jay's views regarding slavery would be Dnportant at this time:
As to my sentiments and conduct relative to the abolition of slavery, the
fact is this: - In my opinion every
man of every colour and description,
has a natural right to freedom, and
I shall ever acknowledge myself to be
an advocate for the manumission of
slaves, in such way as may be consistent
with the justice due to them, with the
justice due to their masters, and with
the regard due to the actual state of
society. These considerations unite in
convincing me that the abolition of
slavery must be necessarily gradual. 28
Jay was convinced that slavery was morally wrong, thus he was
not too inclined to press the issue tor indemnification,
especially if the whole negotiation would be negligible because

ot it.
Since the planters represented the agricultural
interests of the United States, the government was just as
obliged to secure justice for this class as well as the merchan
class. The southerners said that they could not pay their
debts, because their slaves, who worked the land tor them,
were in British hands.
Jay insisted to Grenville that the carrying away
27 ~., 280.
28

w.

Jay, The Life of John Jay, J.J. Harper, New York, 18~3,
I, 285.
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of the negroes, contrary to the seventh article of the treaty
of peace, was the first aggression. Grenville failed to see
in this any violation of all.
Britain maintained

tha~

the slaves, once in the

lines or Britain, were freed and no longer considered property,
so no indemnification was necessary. Britain had abolished
slavery, and had promised freedom to the American slaves who
came within the BritiSh lines. This of course was a trick used
to her own advantage. Some negroes left their masters to seek
this freedom, while others were captured and became British
property until given their freedom. It must be pointed out
here that England did not always feel so obliged to carry out
her promises especially regarding the evacuation of American
posts. Mr. Ogg said: "In other wordB, the carrying away of the
negroes was justifiable in view of the pledges previously made
to them." 29
Randolph wrote to Grenville "••• that while property
is acquired in movables as soon as they come within the power
of the enemy, yet property rights thus acquired in war may,
by the treaty of peace be renounced." 30 By this statement
Randolph admitted what day was careful not to, that the slaves
became British property.
Britain would not concede to pay for the slaves,
29 Ogg, 282.
30 Ibid., 285.
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and :ray began to feel that the whole treaty was being endangered by his refusal to yield on these comparatively minor
issues. Mr. Lyman stated: "From any point of view the matter
was too insignificant to wreck the treaty upon it, and :ray
waived the claim."

31.

There was no mention made ot reparation tor the
slaves in the final draft of the treaty. :ray abandoned this
point, and the Southerners later felt - abandoned their interests tor the sake of the commercial privileges given to New
England.
The slave holders ot the south, knowing
well the abolitionist propensities of
:ray, were not slow to conclude that he
had willingly betrayed their interests
by trading off their claims in return
for commercial privileges tor New England.
And, moreover, since the people in
the North could not find in the treaty
any very substantial commercial advantages,
the acquisition of which could be attributed
to the abandonment of the slave owners'
demands, there remained. little ground for
hope that the question might not again
disturb our diplomatic relations. 32
Camillus stated that the laws of war gave England
the right to possess real property which would fall into her
hands. Negroes were personal property and liable to become
booty, thus they belonged to the enemy as soon as they crossed
the British lines. Britain was free to use them or set
3 1 Lyman, 305.
32 Ogg, 295.

th~
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tree, but restitution was impossible. Camillus said: "Nothing
in the laws of nations or in those of Great Britain therefore,
will authorize the resumption of liberty once granted to a
human being."

33

In answer to this, it could be said that the

negroes were freed by BritiSh laws, but in the United States
slavery was still a thriving institution, and there were no
laws abolishing it. The slaves would not be considered free.
Throughout this letter, Hamilton's detestation of slavery and
his admi»ation for Britain can be clearly discerned.
BOUNDARY

The next question that came up for discussion was
the boundary dispute. This was quite lengthy and detailed, but
it will only be necessary to give a brief summary of this point
of contnetion. By the treaty of peace, the northern boundary
was set at 45°north latitude on the st. Lawrence River. This
line was impossible because the Mississippi River rises south
of the latitude of the Lak-ot-the-woods. A boundary gap of
about 175 miles was left between the source of the Mississippi
and the northernmost corner of the Lake-of-the-woods. In other
words the Mississippi River was the western boundary, and the
northern boundary ran from the, Lake-of-the-Woods to Lake
Superior and followed the Great Lakes to the st. Lawrence
River, then the St. Croix in the northeast. This dispute over
33 Hamilton, 191.
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the boundary grew out of a dubious identity of the River

st.

croix. Besides this question, Grenville insisted on settling
the northwestern boundary.
He felt that a line drawn due west from the Lakeof-the-Woods would not strike the Mississippi River. He proposed two lines therefore: one of which was a line from the
West Bay of Lake Superior, due west to the Red Lake River (the
east branch of the Mississippi), the boundary was tllen to run
down that tributary to the main river; the second proposal was
a line due north from the confluence of the St. Croix River
to the Mississippi until it would meet the waterway between
Lake Superior and the Lake-of-the-Woods.
These lines would have meant a cessioa of between
30,000 and 35,000 square miles of American territory. The
United states would have lost valuable iron and copper deposits
Jay held his ground on this point and refused to yield. 34
The boundary dispute was provided for in the
treaty. Article four provided that there was to be a joint
survey beginning at 1° latitude below the falls of st. Anthony
to the source of the Mississippi River. The boundary rectification would be dependent upon the result of this survey.
34 For map of Grenville's proposals see Appendix I.

!IF
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There was to be a

join~

commission of three men to determine

what river was intended under the name st. Croix. The commission determined {at a later date) that the schoodiac was
the river intended by the negotiators of 1783. This settled
the northeastern boundary.

CHAPTER V
T.HE TREATY AND NEUTRALITY

As a treaty of AMITY, it is partia~
and defective;
As a treaty of COMMERCE, it is not
reciprocal;
As a treaty of NAVIGATION, it is
humiliating
And it is, in other respects, destructive
to the prosperity, security and independence
of the United States; and subversive to the
CONSTITUTION. 1
Throughout the following chapters, an attempt
will be made to show whether this quotation was a truth or an
untruth.
PRINCIPLm OF NEUTRALITY
Jay failed to obtain recognition, in the treaty,
of the modern principles of the laws of nations. England held
to her old principles, and would not waver. It was in this regard that many authors telt the United States abandoned her
treaty with France. In this part or the treaty Jay definitely
departed from his instructions and the principles of America.
FBEE SHIPS-FREE GOODS ABANDONED

Jay abandoned the principle ttfree ships - free

1 Am. Rem., III, 306.
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-69goods~ in favor of the older principle "enemy ships - enemy

goods", England's favorite. Article twenty•seven of the treaty
was aimed directly at America's trade with Franca, and was
contrary to a previous treaty with that country. :ray also
abandoned one of the restrictions ( to make no treaty contrary
to the one with France) placed in his instructions.
Mr.

Lyman stated:

There was, also, an express declaration
that the Flag did not cover the merchandise.
This is the only treaty, signed by America,
in whieh this acknowledgment can be found.
We have never been able to obtain from
England a denial of this right of the
belligerent, but silence wears a different
aspect from the direct confirmation of
the legality and practice. 2
Camillus naturally justified the article in many
wa~

He believed that a belligerent had the right to search a

neutral or an enemy ship, but he doubted if the enemy goods on
board a neutral ship were seizable. The right of search was
necessary to seizure. The captain of the enemy vessel could
determine the just cause of search.
The reasoning employed to prove that all
neutral ships, on the main ocean, are
liable to capture, is supported by the
the ablest writers on public law, and
their decision is believed to be unanimously
in its favor. 3
2 Lyman, 305.
3 Hamilton, 448.
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ThenCamillus discussed "why" the article was looked upon with
s eorn:
The principle complaint, is not, that
the article exposed our own property to
loss by capture, for this is not the
ease, but that it does not prote~t
enemy's property on board our vessels. 4
Since England was at war with France at the time
of the signing of the treaty, it would have been to America's
advantage to recognize the principle that free ships make free
goods, for she could profit by trading with France who badly
needed neutral carriers. France's navy was no match for that
of England's, because England was superior on the seas. An
article recognizing this new principle by England would have
been advantageous to Franee, thus England could never submit
to such a recognition. In the treaty she was successful in
maintaining the ancient rule "that enemy goods on a neutral
vessel were liable to seizurert. She wanted this article in the
compact, and so was willing to grant a few other concessions
in order to gain it, for it meant much more to her than the
few privileges.
Camillus stated (again justifying England) -

"an

impediment by any third nation to the exercise of the

4 Ibid. 1 441.
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right of capture on the ocean by either of the belligerent
parties, would be an injury." 5 He sanctioned England's right
of search and seizure.
cato, another writer using this pseudonym, stated
that article seventeen empowered Britain (contrary to the
armed neutrality principle) to take enemies' property from
aboard .American vessels. Even though the principle "free ships
free goods" was new to the law of nations, the previous law
of nations had been the law of the British Admiralty courts:
I ask whether the neglect to make any
precise stipulation in this case is not
a new proof, of what I have before observed, that where the law of nation was
favorable to us, no stipulation was made
to eritorce it; and that where it is
unfavorable, there it is strengthened by
an express provision? an instance of
doubt occurring in this very article.Doubts might be entertained, whether
neutral ships should not protect enemies'
property - these doubts are determined
against us, by the express words ot the
article; while our right to freight, &c.
is left to Judge Green's construction of
the laws of nations. 6
Decius stated his opinion of this article in the
following:
As a ne~tral and trading people, and as
a nation, likely, with common prudence,
ever to continue at peace with all the
5

Ibid., 4.4.3.

6 Am.

R~,

I, 228.
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world, we should have insisted, even at
the risque or war, especially when making
a treaty, that free vesBels should make
free goods.With what people are we afraid
or going to war, that we are so anxious to
restrain the vessels of Great Britain from
carrying their effects? There is but one
country with which our government appears
soliticious to embroil us, and that is
]'ranee. Should such a war really take place •••
is it probable Great Britain would become
carriers for the Frsnch? and if she did,
would our government dare to authorize her
citizens to make prize of any property on
board her vessels?
Between the two Britain and France,
what is to become of American vessels? 7
The writers,who opposed the article, were of the
opinion that even though the old principle (enemy goods could
be seized in neutral vessels) was a part ot the law of nations,
the modern interpretation, through recent treaties, changed
or annulled this old law, and established another in its
stead; equally binding on the world. Camillus, taking the opposite viewpoint, reminded them "••• the treaties, which stipulate that free ships make free goods, also stipulate that
enemy ships make enemy goods.n 8 In other words the goods or a
neutral round in the ships of an enemy were liable to capture.
Congress said that neutral bottoms should protect enemy goods,
but here it stopped. The capture and condemnation of neutral
7 Ibid., II, 158.
8 Hamilton, 451.
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goods found an enemy ship was never authorized by Congress,

tor such an authorization would have been a violation of the
rights of neutral powers.

9

Cato felt that the United States would probably
be at peace while Britain would be at war many tiRes in the
tuture, and would have the right to dispose of prizes in
American harbors as provided for in the treaty. Britain was
America's natural enemy (interests clashed because of the
contiguity of their territories), thus if America were opposed
to Britain in a naval war, the treaty would cease to operate;
if America were her ally she would have privileges without
the treaty. America, thereby, made the concession by giving
10
in on this article.
~ay

definitely contravened his instructions by

agreeing to article seventeen, for he was restricted in that
he was not to make a treaty whiCh would be contrary to Americd
treaty with Frane e.. Other treaties had been made with Holland
and Denmark recognizing this new international law, and so it
beeame·an American priUDiple, and in the

~ay

Treaty the oppo-

site doctrine was accepted.
Professor Bemis also criticized
9 Ibid., 456.

10 .Am..Rem~ ,cato No. XII, I.

~ay

in the

-'14following:
Jay's Treaty failed to secure recognition
of the principles of international maritime
law which theUnited States under the Government of the Confederation had written into all
of its treaties with friendly foreign powers
or allies - France, the Netherlands, Prussia,
Sweden - principles which accorded with the
definitions of the First Armed Neutrality. 11
CONTRABAND
In regard to contraband Jay practically admitted

that provisions were cont,raband of war, although provisiOiils,
as

su~,

were not mentioned in the treaty. By one word, however

the United States committed herself to this doctrine, and the
word was "existingn. When used with"the law ot nations•, it
meant acquiesence in contraband, for Britain maintained that
provisions were contraband of war by the •existing law of
nations•.
• •• whereas .the treaty of 1'144 does not
in terms authorize the seizure of provisions
and other articles not generally contraband,
excepting in oases, when by the existing
law of nations they become so. 12
The writer disagreed with the opinion expressed
by Mr. Gray regarding contraband:
That by the modern law of nations,
provisions are not, in ~neral deemed
contraband; but they may become so,
11 Bemis, 250.
12

F.C. Gray, "Jay's Treaty Free Ships - Free Goods", North
American Review, 0. Everett, Boston, 1823, XVII, 156.
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although the property of a neutral, on
account of the particular situation of the
war or on account of their destination.
If destined for the ordinary use of life
in the enemy's country they are not in
general contraband; but it is otherwise
if destined for the army and navy of the
enemy, or for his ports of naval and
military equipment, they are deemed
contraband. 13
The question can be asked - who would determine the use of the
provisions? One of the belligerents would maintain that the
provisions were intended for military use, and would confiscate
thaa; the other belligerent, for whom the provisions were intended, would state that they were for the general use of the
people. Up to this time in History, provisiams had not been
considered contraband. Cato felt that Jay should have specified
those oases (where provisicns would be seized and not be considered as contraband) as accurately as possible. The occasions
for seizing articles of contraband were undefined. The judge,
therefore, would have to determine (when a ship was brought in)
whether her cargo , consisting of provisions and other article
was or was not a case in which the provisions became contraband. England could now condemn every American vessel going to
France, thereby leaving American commerce in the hands of a
judge of the British Admiralty. 14
13 Ibid., 153.
14 Am. Rem., Cato No. IX, I.
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••• I have not yet, after the most diligent
search, round a single treaty in whi~ the
same latitude is given the word contraband,
as Mr. Jay has given it in his treaty with
Lord Grenville: nor have I met with one,
though such possibility may exist, in whiCh
no provision is made to guard the neutral
ship from search and spoliation. 15
In the treaties with France, Spain, and Holland contraband was
defined and confined to arms, munitions, and military stores.
It did not, however, include naval stores as did the Jay Treaty
Cato could not understand Jay's attitude in
agreeing to let provisions and naval stores be contraband.
Previously in a treaty with France, Britain

ex~pted

naval

stores from the list of contraband. Even if certain articles
were contraband, by common politeness, Britain should have
exempted America as others had done, and as she herself had
done with France. Cato said:

l5

~··

221.
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Britain already at war with a nation who
furnishes us a good market for them.? Are
they not staples, of our country, which
we have a very considerable interest in
shipping? What equivalent does the treaty
hold out to us for ielinquishing this
important branch of commerce? ••• will
Mr. Jay assert, that these were contraband by
the modern law of nations? 16

-

Even Camillus admitted that this article was
"unpleasant":
I even admit that it has one unpleasant
ingredien~ in it, and I ~ convinced
that our envoy must have consented to
it with reluctance.
The most labored, and at the same
time, the most false of the charges against
the eighteenth article is, that it allows
provisions to be contraband in cases not
heretofore warranted by the laws(of nations,
and refers to the belligerent party, the
decision of what those cases are. 17
His reasons for opposition were:
It is this, that though the true meant~g
of the clause, be such as I contend for,
still the existence of it affords to
Great Britain a pretext for abuse which
she may improve to our disadvantage.
I answer, it is difficult to guard
against all the perversions of a contract
which ill faith may suggest. 18
Yet he found an excuse even for this:
But while I confess, that the including
of naval stores, among contraband articles
is an ineligible feature of the treaty, I
16 Ibid., 221.
17 Hamilton, 468-469.
18 Ibid., 476.
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ought to declare, that its consequences
to the interests of the United States,
as it regards the trade in those articles
in time of war, do not appear to me important. 19
·
SHIPS OF WAR AND PRIZES
According to article twenty-four:

~It

shall not

be lawful for any foreign privateers ••• who have commissions
from any other prince or state in enmity with either nation to
arm their ships .in the ports of either of the said parties,
nor to sell what they have taken, nor in any other manner to
20
exehange the same •••• "
By this article, then, no power at
war with Britain could sell its prizes in American harbors.
This was contrary to the law of nations (independent of
treaties) which provided that any nation may carry her prizes
to a neutral port, and se£1 them. France, without an express
stipulation to that effect in her treaty with America, had
been permitted to sell her prizes in American ports. To withdraw that license when France was involved in war against
England would not only have been contrary to the law of nations
but also would present an unfriendly appearance.
Article twenty-five provided that America and
Britain could bring prizes to each other's ports without having
19 Ibid., 484.
20 MacDonald, 255.
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the prizes detained or seized. It also provided that no shelter
be given in their ports, to ships of countries who made a
prize upon the subjects or citizens of each ot the parties to
the treaty. This article was an inconsistenc-y on Jay's part •.
By the treaty with France, America had granted France the
privilege of bringing her prizes to American ports, and it
would seem that by this treatise France was definitely denied
this privilege. Later on in the article, however, the following:
was expressed: nNothing in this treaty cont'-ined shall, howeve
be construed or operate contrary to former and existing public
treaties with other sovereigns and states.n 21 This apparently
exempted France, but it remained to be seen whether Britain
would hold to her promise.
CONCLUSION
What advantages did America rec5tve regarding
neutrality in this treaty? The answer is - none. America did
not adhere to her doctrine that free ships meant free goods,
a principle she had established in previous treaties. Jay also
adhered to a new principle which operated to

~erica's

disad-

vantage, namely, accepting provisions and naval stores as
~ontraband.

21

How provisions ethically and morally could be

~., 257.

-solisted as contraband was hard to discern. Although at a later
date provisions were declared contraband. If the provisions
were intended for military purposes, it would be more readily
accepted, but when intended for general use, it cannot be defended. Britain would agree to such an article because it
worked to her advantage •. She was superior on the seas, and
thereby was assured of obtaining her supplies. By this naval
superiority she could also subdue her enemy faster by seizing
provisions intended for her enemy's use.
Th~

articles pertaining to ships of war and

prizes worked to England's advantage once again. America, by
agreeing to the document, maintained an unfriendly attitude
to her former ally, France. Several of the articles were aimed
directly at France by their indirect operation on America.
England's advantages can easily be seen.
Jay was to seek protection !or .American seamen
against impressment into Britain's navy. This was specifically
listed in his instructions. Yet not one provisiaa pertained
to this subject. Jay cannot be criticized too severely for
this because he could not wring concessions from Britain when
he had nothing to use as a

"persuader~.

England was able to

-81dictate the terms of the treaty because of her superior position. She had no intention of abandoning impressment, for
that was her only way of maintaining her navy. To have abandoned
the whole treaty because of several small matters would have
been foolhardy. By not obtaining a clause regarding the seamen,
it seemed to the people that the government was not protecting
the rights of its individual citizens. Even if Britain consente
to abandon the practice in theory, it was doubtful whether she
would have carried it out in practicality. Camillus said, " A
general stipulation against impreswnent of our seamen would
22
have been nugatory, if not derogatory."
This matter was
a major issue previous to the

war

of 1812.

Nothing was said pertaining to paper blockades.
At the time they were quite numerous.

22 Hamilton, 212,

CHAPTER VI
THE

Cill~CIAL

ASPECTS OF THE TREATY

Blessed be the treaty makers! By their
fruits, ye shall know them! 1
Although Britain was supposed to have granted a
number of concessions to America in regard to commerce, the so
called concessions were negative. In reality America would have
had to pay heavily for such favors.
WEST INDIA TRADE
The twelfth article of the treaty opened the
British West Indies to American trade, and here Jay seemed
(for the first time) to be fulfilling his instructions, but
American vessels could not be heavier than seventy tons. In a
way Jay was carrying out his orders, for the limiting of
tonnage was distinctly stated. In return for this great favor
from England, America was not to export to any port in the
world any at the tropical products of the Indies (this was a
British monopoly). These tropical products were specifically
named: cotton, coffee, sugar, molasses, and cocoa. The stipulation would have deprived America of the benefits she derived
1 Am. Ram., II, 288.
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from a state of neutrality during the war. The effect on the
American cotton, which was just beginning to be an important
export from America, can be readily se:en. Foreign nations
would then become carriers tor American trade.
Atticua criticized the article in this manner:
This article robs us, at a blow, of the
carrying trade, and deprives us of the
privilege of exporting West India produce,
although imported from other islands Nay, there is not one exception in favor
of cotton, the growth of our own country;
and it is well known, that we export cotton
from some of the southern states to a
considerable amount. 2
Cato said:
••• in considering the treaty in a more
commercial view, that it contained an
express relinquishment of the Indian
trade; that it placed the West Indian
commerce upon'as disadvantageous a
footing, as to render foreign nations
our carriers, not only in that trade,
but in the exportation of many articles
(as sugar, cotton, coffee cocoa) that we
might import from the West Indies, or
raise among ourselves; I proceed now to
show that our vessels wtll become
equally useless in the European trade,
if the treaty goes into effect. 3
Britain would sustain the whole of the carrying
trade between the United States and her dominions or possessions. In 1789-1790 the American exports to Britain were
2 Ibid. t 211.
3 ~., I, 162.
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9,363,000 tons; and the imports were 15,200,000 tons. 4
England's advantage can be distinguished.
Camillus, usually the champion of every article
of the treaty, failed to look with fondness upon this commercia
article. Yet he exonerated Jay by saying that the envoy was
probably unfamiliar with the importance of cotton to the
United States.
The exclusion of all vessels above the
burden of seventy tons would diminish
the benefits and value of this trade;
and though we cannot calculate upon
obtaining by future negotiations a total
removal of a limitation on this subject,
it is not altogether improbable that a
tonnage something larger may be procured.
This limitation, though disadvantageous,
is not the strongest objection to the 12th ·
article; the restraining or regulating of
a portion of our trade, which does not
proceed from, and is independent of,the
treaty, forms a more decisive reason against
the article than any thing else that it
contains.
The cause of this restraint is found
in the commercial jealousy and spirit of
monopoly, whicn have so long reigned over
the trade of the colonies.
To have lett it entirely open and free
would have to have enabled us not only to
supplT ourselves by means of our own
navigation, but to have made it an instrument
of the supply of other nations with her
West Indies produetions. 5
4 Ibid., 162.

5 Hamilton, 402-403.
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The wrath of the South was aroused because of
this article. Jay not only failed to secure indemnification
for the negroes, but he also bound the United states to observe a treaty whose stipulation curbed its commercial interests. Mr. Mowat maintained that the article only hurt the
New Englanders who wished to get West Indian molasses tor
making rum.

6

Frotessor Bemis stated the following:
The restraints which the twelfth article
have placed on American exportations of
West Indian products, would have cut ott
the reexportation not only of ~gli~ but
ot French and all other foreign West Indian
products, and incidentally it would have
prevented for the period of the war then
in existence between England and France
the development of American domestic
cotton export, the prospective importance
of whiCh nobody then appreciated. 7
Cato felt that America could do without the
trade with the British islands, for only one-eighth of
American trade was with them. As an example to further
prove his point, he used the amount of sugar imported into
the Unit.ed S'ta tes in 1790. He gave no authority to authenticate his figures:
5

Mowat, 25.

7 Bemis, 258.
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SUGAR IMPORTED INTO THE UNITED STATES IN 1790
Fren~

Islands

9,521,829 lbs.

Dutch Islands

2,707,131

Danish Islands

2,833,016
14,861,975

British Islands

2,230,647
17,092,523

On

the other hand those islands were very dependent upon the

United States tor their supplies. America could trade on her
own terms. Britain was not reciprocal by opening the trade in
the islands.
Previous to the treaty Britain severely criticize
France tor opening her West Indian trade to Amerioa who was a
neutral nation, because France was involved in war. The openin
of this trade was a supposed violation of a principle ot
international law which was - trade not open to a neutral in
time of peace, cannot be opened in time of war. By the J"ay
Treaty, however, Britain opened her West Indian trade to a

neutral~eric~in time of war. Yet she looked upon her action
as being in accordance with the law of nations. England's

8 Am. Ram., I, 230.
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inconsistency can be seen; any violation of internationa1 1aw
that worked to her advantage was to be upheld - if it worked
to her disadvantage the action was a breach of maritLme law.
England also violated international law in making a treaty with
America at that particular time,

b~cause

a belligerent was not

to make a treaty with a neut.ral during wartime. But this was
not to be considered because of the supremacy of the country
performing these indiscretions.
The Senate refused to ratity the treat.y with this
article as a part of it. In the final ratification it was suspended with England's consent. For a further discussion see
Chapter Eight.
EAST INDIA TRADE

A,rticle thirteen permitted the United Sill tes to
trade in the East Indies also. This again was supposedly anothe
great concession on England's part, tor her own subjects were
not authorized to trade there. The Bast India Company had a
monopoly on this trade. In a general overall view of the article
it would seem a favor to

~erica,

as usual, however, there

again were restriction:
But it is

expressly agreed, that the

-savessels of the United states shall not
carry any of the articles exported by
thsm from the said British territories,
to any port or place, except to some port
or place in America, where the same shall
be unladen ••••
It is also understood that the
permission granted by this article, is not
to extend to allow the vessels ot the United
States to carry on any part of the coastingtrade of the said British territories. 9
These two restrictions nullified any advantages received by
America in the first part of the article.
Cato, Decius, and Camillus presented opposite
viewpoints on the article, Decius and Cato being 1n agreement:
Decius said:
The merchants, who are certainly the most
competent judges in these matters, contend,
that the trade of the United States to the
East Indies, is placed on a much worse footing
than before. They assign, among others the
following reasons: lst, That American vessels
carry a small proportion of salted provisions
to Bombay, · where they take in eot ton and
sharkskins on freight to Uhina, which. was so
considerable, as to enable them to lay in a
return cargo to great advantage ••••
2d. That American ships going to Bengal,
frequently found very advantageous freights
to some free ports in Europe •••• It is
supposed that nine-tenths of our trade to
the British East Indies was carried on in this
way.
3d. The direct trade to Bengal and Bombay
was trifling until the sugar plantations in
the West Indies were destroyed. We then imported
9 MacDonald, 251.
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sugar from the East Indies to advantage;
but on the restoration of peace, this trade
cannot be pursued but to disadvantage - the
voyage being too long, the sugar not so
strong ••• , and the supplies from the islands
being sufficient tor any use we can make of
th~, the former not answering to refine. 10
Cato stated:
The fact, with respect to that trade, is,
that as the merchandizes carried to India
consist of commodities which the European
nations cannot conveniently supply together
with money and necessaries for refitting their
ships; As the proceeds of these cargoes are
employed in purchasing India toods from the
factors of the European nation at whose ports
we trade, there is a clear profit in admitting
us freely to their ports, and thereby rendering
such ports the entrepots between the United
States and India.
The rBstrictions in the trade have thus
narrowed, instead of enlarging, our advantages
in trading to the British factories; but as all
the others are open to us, she will be compelled
to receive us or lose our commerce; and as her
ports afford no peculiar advantage, neither
the one nor the other merits our attention:
the article as far as iit goes, is not good;
but one can hardly call it bad, when connected
with the rest of the treaty; the deficiency of
grace in a single feature does not attract
our noti~e, when the whole face is strikingly
deformed. 11
Camillus felt:
It is said that we are already in the
enjoyment of a less restrained commerce
with the British territories in India,
and that the treaty will alter it for the
lO Am.. Rem!.t II, 136.

11 Ibid., I, 219.
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worse: ina~uch as we thereby incapacitate
ourselves to carry on any part or the
coasting trade of the British territories
in India, and as we relinquish the profitable
freights to be made between Bombay and
Canton, and likewise those sometimes
obtained from the English territories
in Bengal and Ostend. 12
Previously, the trade was only temporary and liable to variation at any time, but by the treaty it was placed on a more
stable footing since Britain could not change the trade for
twelve years (the period of time covered by the article}.
The trade with the East and West Indies was not
as opportunistic as at first believed. The merchants

th~selves

were not satisfied with the terms of the articles pertaining
to this commerce.
DOMINIONS AND TRADE
The terms of the fourteenth article regarding
trade with the dominions of Great Bri ts.in

se~ed

to be reeipro-

ealt but again the advantages were on the British side of the
scale. American territories were opened to British merchants
for trade, but American trade was confined to the spot precisely on which American traders found no interest in settling
in canada. Therefore, American trade was practically limited
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to trade in .American territories. Ameri'can merchants received
no advantages over British merchants. The British merchants
camld trade with equal advantage in American territory, and
superior advantage in British territory.
Cato said:
If the present arrangement will as I
have shown, oppress our commerce and
destroy our navigation - if it banishes
our seamen, and starves our ship carpenters if it puts our whole trade into the hands
of' foreigners even for a time "'! how many
years will it take, under the wises~ and
best ·arrangements, to recover the ground
we lost? - Every thing must be re-created;
and the discouragement we must then give
to foreign navigation, after having lost
our own, which will be felt by every order
of people. This distress will again be the
argument for new humiliations, and our
subjugation to Britain be rendered perpetual ••••
Why relinquish every thing, to gain nothing. 13
EUROPEAN TRADE

The article pertaining to the European trade
read as follows:
It is agreed that no other or hi~er
duties shall be paid by the ships or
merchandize of one party in the ports
of the other, than such as are paid by
the like vess~s or merchandize of all
other nations ~oat favored nation claus~
But the ritisb. government reserves
to i tseU the right of imposing on
.American vessels entering into the BritiSh
13 ;Am. Rem., Cato No. VII, I, 174.
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ports in Europe, a tonnage duty equal
to that which shall be payable by
British vessels in the ports of America:
And also such duty as may be adequate to
countervai~ the difference of duty now
payable on the importation of European
and Asiatic goods, when i~ported into
the United States in British or in
American vessels.
In the interval it is agreed, that
the United states will not impose any
new or additional tonnage duties on
British vessels, nor increase the nowsubsisting difference between the duties
payable on the importation ot any articles
in British or in Am.eri can vessels. 14
These last two provisions were assailed in the
Uni~ed

States, for the power of Congress {to regulate commerce)

was challenged. This article regulated the commerce between
America and Britain, which was a power of Congress.
British vessels had to pay only 50 cents per ton
on goods sent to .Am.erica, because the British merchant paid
the same tonnage duty in .America as American citizens, and
his return cargo paid no duties in England. On the other hand
the American merchant could ship the same articles on the
same terms, but by the fifteenth article, Britain had the
right to lay on the return cargo a duty of ten per-cent - thus
the American would have to pay 55 cents per ton. The British
14 MacDonald, 253.
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did not have to pay a tonnage duty in the West Indies, while
the vessels of the United States did. America was prohibited
by the terms of the article from imposing any new duties. 15
CONCLUSION
Naturally all of the det~ils of these aspects of
commerce could not be brought forth in this work, for they
were too numerous and detailed.
In recapitulation then, {1) the treaty prevented
the United States from imposing new duties on tonnage, while
Britain was permitted to impose additional duties on American
~

vessels; (2) the British could prevent America from carrying
produce to France and Rolland, if she declared them in a state
of seige •.~erica eould not carry their produce to Europe.
By the most favored nation clause Britain benefitted, for there were many commercial opportunities that
would be given to America which would not be given to Britain.
For exam!'le, if Spain opened the IvUssissippi River to America.
for trade, Britain would also share in it by this stipulation.
Britain would not receive such an opportunity in her own
behalf.
Will Spain consent to open the
Mississippi to us, when we have divided
15 By article twenty-eight it was agreed that the frist ten
articles of the treaty were to be permanent, and that the
other articles (ex~ept the twelfth) were to be in effect
for twelve years. The twelfth article was temporary, in that
it was to last for the duration of the war between England
and France or for two ears after the treat was ratified

~--------------------------------~
-94the benefits with Great Britain?
can it be supposed that she will
have less jealousy ot.both, than
she had of one? Events wiLl determine these questions •••• 16
The commercial advantages certainly were on the
side of Britain - America was probably receiving more commercial advantages without the treaty. cato also felt this
way, as the following will bring out:
Now let me ask, whether our commerce
is not upon a much worse tooting, than
it was before Mr. Jay went to England?
Whether every injury, tor which he was
sent to seek redress, has not been
renewed with double rigour? 17

16 Am. Ram., Atticus No. IV, II, 225.
17 Ibid., I, 232.

CHAPTER VII
ANALYSIS OF OTHER ARTICLES
The teleseope of Herschel is necessary
to discover the advantages said to be
contained in the treaty with Great
Britain; for they are so distant and .
so obscure, that, like the mountains
in the moon, they can only be seen
through an extraordinary magnifying
medium. 1
NATURALIZATION
The second article o! the treaty not only pertained to the evacuation of the posts, but also provided a
definite status tor the settlers who remained within that
territory. These settlers could enjoy all o! their property-,
and were .to be protected. They were at liberty to remain in
the territory or to remove their effects. Those that

r~ained

were not required to become .Am.erican citizens or to take an
oath o:t allegiance to the government. Those who did not declare
their allegiance to the British king, "shall be considered as
2
having elected to become citizens of the United states."'
This was criticized because it declared who shall
become citizens of the United states. The: right of naturali1 Am. Rem., II, 222.

2 MacDonald, 245.
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zation was given to Cpngress by the

constitu~ion.

In

Article I,

section 8 - nThe Congress shall have Power To establiah an
unito~

Rule of Naturalization •••• "

3

The treaty supposedly

gave this power to the president and senate, thus infringing
upon a Congressional right. Atticus said: "••• but by the 2d
article of the treaty, the president and senate have establishe
a rule of naturalization within the precincts and jurisdiction
of the posts. The pretended federalist. will supply a name for
so daring an attack upon a constitution which they have extoll
as the perfection of human wisdom." 4
In considering the treaty, however, the British
government was guaranteeing protection for its subjects, a
course America would most definitely have taken. They were protected from being coerced into American citizenship. If after
one year the settlers did not declare their alleagiance to the
British king, they wera considered to have elected American
citizenship. The text of the article did not say "are citizens",
therefore, Congress could still determine whether they complied
with the laws of naturalization. It was not taking a power
away from Congress.
INLAND NAVIGATION

It is agreed that it shal'l at all times
3 Ibid., 221.

4 Am R~., II, 225.
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be tree to his Majesty's subjects,
and to the citizens ot the Unit:ed
States, and also to the Indians
dwelling on either side ot the
said boundary iine, treely to pass
and repass by land or inland navigation, into the respective territories
and countries ot the two parties, on
the continent ot America (the country
within the limits ot the Hudson's Bay
company only excepted) and to navigate all the lakes, rivers and waters
thereat, and freely to carry on trade
and commerce With each other •••• this
article does not extend to the admission
ot vessels ot the United states into
the seaports, Harbours ••• ot his Majesty's
said territories as are between the mouth
thereot, and the high~t port of entry
from the sea. The river M1ssissippi shall,
however, ••• be entirely open to both
parties •••• 5 (article two}
Once again the treaty appeared ·to be reciprocal,
but restrictions were apparent. This passage by land or
inland was a greater acquisition tor Britain according to
Decius. America did not have free navigation of the st. Lawren
River and other Britiah waters. A British trader could set
out from Canada and was free to bring his merchandise down to
New York or Philadelphia. American merchants, however, were
stopped at the highest point of entry to hire British cargoes.
Deoius stated:
Upon a cursory reading, it appears to

~·
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•

~ay Great Britain under a similar
restraint but the least attention
will discover this not to be the.
case. It is this, 'British vessels
:rrom the sea are not to be adliiitted
into our rivera beyond the highest
port of entry for vessels from the
sea.' What~ Great Britain wish
tor mor&? would her sea vessels
ever att~pt, if permitted, to go
further than the highest port or
entry. 5

Camillus favored this freedom or inland navigation
as being a part or the spirit of America:
The maxims or the United States have
hitherto favored a tree intercourse
with all the world. ~ey have conceived,
that they had nothing to tear trom the
unrestrained.competition of commercial
enterprise, ~d have only desired to be
admit ted to it on equal t erma.
Our envoy, therefore, in agreeing
to a liberal plan of intercourse with
the British territories in our neighborhood has conformed to the general spirit
ot our country, and to the general policy
of our laws. 7
Policy does not attaia anything it' it is not reciprocal. Since
this provision was not reciprocal, it did not have any advantages for America.
SEQ.UESTRA'r!ON AND CONFISCATION

Debts, shares, or monies held by individuals of
either country, whether they be in public funds or in private.

5 Am. Ran., II, 122.
7 Hamilton, 245.

-99or public banks, will not be confiscated or sequestered in
time of war, so ran article ten. The following were the object
protected by this article: (1} debts of individuals to individuals; (2} property of individuals in public funds; (3}
property of individuals in public banks; (4) property of individuals in private banka. 8
Some writers felt that sequestration and confiscation were retaliatory measures which could be used by a
nation at war to its advantage. According to Cato: "··• £!;
taliation is one of the laws of nations; but that law, so
frequently essential to the support of our rights, is, by
this article, entirely taken away, so far, at least, as relates to this object." 9 Camillua was ot the opinion that it
was heresy to view confiscation as the best means of rataliation and coercion, and the only means of defense:
That is the consequence of the favorite
doctrine that the confiscation or
sequestration of private debts is our
most powerful, if not our only, weapon
of defence. Great Britain is the sole
power against whom we could wield it,
since it is to her citizens alone,
that we are largely indebted.
What do we do to the other nations
who might meance ua? - Or has Providence
guaranteed us specially against the
malice or ambition of every power on
earth, except Great Britain? 10
8 Ibid., Camillus No. XIX.

9 ~. R~., I, 243.

lOHamilton, 350.

,..
r---------------------------------------~
-100-

At that time .America owed millions o:t' dqllars to
Britain not only in private debts but also in public debts.
~erican

citizens, on the other hand, held practically nothing

in British funds or banks - here again Britain was protecting
her subjects,having learned from her experiences in the Revolutionary War. She had mueh to lose if her debts, both public
and private, were confiscated.
Decius said:
It is true, Great Britain promises
the same forbearance on her part;
but upon a m.oment•s-reflection, it
will occur, that this promise, even
if observed, ia in reality no consideration. Millions are due to the
subjects of Great Britain from the
government and from individuals of
the United States; while, comparatively
speaking, our citizens hold nothing in
the British funds or banka, and have
few, if any demands upon the subjects
of that navion. 11
Decius also declared that Bynkershoek, a reliable writer on
international law, recognized the right to seize enemy property (property her also included money). Camilius' view was
just the opposite:
The result is, that by the present
customary law of nations, within
the sphere of its action, there is
no right to confiscate or sequester
11 Am.

R~.,

II, 128.

private debts in time of war.
The reason or moti Y>e of which
law is the advantage and safety
of commerce. 12
Camillus was also of the opinion that property was liable to
seizure as long as it was not trusted to public faith, but in
America property was trusted to the public faith:
This DEPOSIT is found in our hands,
only in consequence of that confidence,
which the proprietor has put
our
good faith, and it ought to be respected,
even in case of open war. 13

rn

As to private property Camillus stated:
As to private property in public funds,
the right to meddle with than is still
more emphatically aegatived. 'The state
does not so much as touch the sums it
owes to the enemy. Ever{ where, in case
of war, funds credited o the public are
exempt from confiscation and seizure.'
These terms manifestly exclude sequestration
as well as confiscation. 14
Regarding this article, it

se~s

Camillus was very prolific,

for he said in conclusiaa:
Thus we perceive, that opinion and
usage, tar from supporting the right
to confisaate or sequester private
property, on accoun~ of national
wars, when referred to the modern
standard, turn against the right, and
coincide with the principle of the
article of the treaty under examination. 15
12 Hamilton, 347.

l3 Ibid ••
14 Ibid ••
15

a±!·

J

353.

~
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CONCLUSION
The other terms of the treaty were not too important. The author has chosen and diseussed the most significant aspects of the document as they affected immediately
the relationship between the United States and Britain. The
treaty was viewed as it affected neutrality and the laws of
nations; as it changed

~he

commercial relationship with re-

gard to the East and West Indies, and the dominion and Europea
trade; and the remaining articles affecting navigation, sequestration and confiscation of debts.
From all conclusions, the statement at the
beginning of Chapter Five {page 45) concerning an evaluation
of the treaty, could be considered as the truth. The treaty
was certainly anything but reciprocal on Britain's part with
regard to commerce, neutral rights and navigation.
Whether another envoy could have obtained a bette
treaty was problematical. Jay undoubtedly did his best under
the circumstances. The treaty was valuable in that it was the
first treaty to be made by the embryo nation, and the fact
that it was with England aided in its importance. It did postpone the dismal prospect of war for a number of years. For
this alone it should receive the highest commendation, even
though it did laQk certain benefits.

CHAPTER VIII
THE TREATY, THE SENATE AND THE EXECUTIVE

CircularThe President of the Uni~ed States to
;
Senator for the State of
• ---Certain-matters, touching the public good,
requiring that 1th e senate shall be convened
on Monday, the Sth'of JUne next, yo~ are
desired to attend at the senate Chamber,
in Phi~adelphia, on that day, then and
there to receive and deliberate on such
communtcations as shall be made to you
on my part. 1
TREATY AND

THE SENATE

Although the president received the treaty, which
was signed on November 19, 1794, in March 1795, he called the
Senate into a special session on June 8, 1795 to discuss the
ratification ot the treaty and ·other documents connected with
it to the Senate (this is important to remanber when the House
sought to obtain these same documents later on).
After the preliminaries and the verification of
credentials were accomplished, the following resolution was
proposed:
Ordered, That the Sinators be under an
·injunction of secrecy on the communications
this day received from the President of the
1 Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the senate of the
United states ot America, Dutl Green, Washington, 1828, I,
177. Hereafter referred to as Ex. Jour ••
-103-

-104-

United States, until the further
order of the Senate. 2
This resolution was passed, thus secreay was to veil the
3
discussions of the treaty in the senate.
The treaty was read and considered on June ll.
On June 12 the following motion was brought forward:
Ordered, That so much pf the resolution
of the 8th instant as enjoins secrecy
upon the Senators with tespeot to the
nommunieations on that day received from
the President, be rescinded. 4
The S@nators agreell to postpone the discussion of this motion
until saturday, June 13.

On

saturday the

~otion

was passed

in the negative; yeas 9, nays 20.
The treaty itself was further discussed on the
15th and loth, and on the latter date ... "It was agreed to
refer the 12th article to the tuture discussions ot the senate
and, after progress in the consideration of the 13th article

• • • •n

5

The following motion was presented on Wednesday,
June 17, after a discussion of only five days:

-

2 Ibid., 178.
3 since secrecy was imposed on the Senate, it is difficult
and practically impossible to obtain any information about
the discussions of the treaty within the chamber. Just
the various motions that were proposed were given in all
of the avaliable sources, and will be presented here.
4

Ex. Jour., 182.

5

..!.ill.. '

182.

Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senate
concurring therein,) 'That they do
consent to, and advise the ~esident
of the United States, to r~tify the
treaty ot Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between his Britannic Majesty
and the United states ot America,
concluded at London, the 19th day of
November, 1794, on condition that
there be added to the said treaty an
article whereby it ~hall be agreed to
suspend the operation ot so·~ueh ot
the 12th article: as respects the
trade which his said Majesty hereby
consents may be carried on between
the United States and his islands
in the West Indies, in the manner,
and on the terms and conditiams
therein specified.
'And the senate recommended
to the President, to proceed without
delay, to further friendly negotiations
with his Majesty, on the subject ot
the said trade, and of the terms and
conditions in question. 6
The Senate was ready to ratity the treaty with the suspension
of the twelfth article. There was not too much opposition to ·
it in this branch of the government.
The twelfth article was discussed further, and
on Friday, June 19, this request was made of the president:

Reaolve.d, That the President, of the
Unitil !tates be requested to cause
to be laid befor_e the senate the
reports of John Jay while in the
office of Foreign Affairs, the
correspondence between the commander
6 Ibid ••
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in Chier of the American army with
Sir Guy Carleton, on the subject of
the 7th article of the treaty ot
Peace with Great Britain, and also
Mitchel's map of North America. 7
The information desired was necessary in order to find Jay's
views about the negro question, and the deli'V·ery of the posts
by the British.
The reconsideration of the motion, made on the
17th, respecting the twelfth article was resumed on saturday,
June 20. The three Tolumes of the reports of Jay, while
Secretary of state, and the correspondence with Sir Guy
carleton, were presented for an examination by the senate.
Burr proposed, on June 22, that the motion of the
17th be postponed in order to effect alterations on the following artioles of the treaty: two, three, six, and twelve; while
the ninth, tenth, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth be expunged.
He wanted to change the second article so that the settlers
and traders mentioned would have no privileges or rights other
than t.hose which we;re given to them by the treaty of 1783.
The third article he would obliterate or so modify it that the
citizens of the United States could use all rivers etc. within
British territories, in other words, have rights equal to the
7

~·· 183.

,.~------------------~--------------------------~

-107-

British rights in America. The British in consequence of not
paying for the negroes carried

awa~,

would pay tor the loss

and damage sustained by her retention of the posts. The
twelfth article would be excluded unless the United states was
not restrained in the exportation of any articles of the
produae of the said islands. The discussion of this matter was
postponed until JUne 23. It then passed in the negatiYel yeas
10, nays 20.

The motion ot the 17th respecting the ratific;atio
of the treaty and suspension of the twelfth article was reconsidered. Senator Read made a motion, which was seconded by
senator Butler, to amend the motion so that after the word

"specified"~ast word in the first paragrap~these words be
inserted:
'And also tor obtaining adequate
compensation tor the negroes, or
other property of the .American
inhabitants, carried oft tram the
United States, in violation of the
definitive treaty of peace and
friendship, between his said Majesty
and the United States, signed at Paris,
the 3d day of Sept. 17B3.L 8
After deliberation it was agreed that Read withdraw his motion in order to introduce a motion drawn up with
8 Ib,id., 185.
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more consideration on the same subject.
A motion was then made to postpone

th~

motion

~otion of the l7t~before the Senate to take into consideratio

a list of reasons tor not ratifying the treaty. (1} The United
States did not receive satisfaction tor the negroes carried
away; (2) the rights of the individual states were unconstitutionally invaded by the ninth article; (3) it rested on
legislative discretion to exercise power prohibited by the
tenth article; (4} the eommercial aspects lacked reciprocity;
(5}

the treaty prevents the United states tram controlling

:1ns commerce and navigation with other nations; '6th.Becauae

the treaty asserts a power in the President and Senate, to

control, and even

annihilat~

the constitutional right of the

Congress of the Uni1ted States over their commercial. intercours
with foreign nations.' 9 This was important,, in that, the
Senate recognized the infringement of a Congressional

righ~

to

regulate commerce; the construction of this treaty might
produce infractions ot treaties subsisting between the
states

and

Uni~ed

her allies: 'Notwithstanding the senate will not

consent to the ratification of this treaty, they advise the
President of the United states to continue his endeavors, by
9 Ibid., 185-186.

-109triendly discussion with his Britannic Majesty, to adjust all
the real Muses o:r complaint between the two nations .. ' 10
This was passed in the negative; yeas lO, nays
19. Another motion was proposed to divide the original motion
o:r the 17th so as to adopt the first paragraph ending with the
word "specified". This was passed in the affirmative; yeas 20,
nays 10. The second paragraph recommending further negotiation
was not adopted. The following men voted tor ratifying the
treaty with the twel:fth article suspended: J. Livermore, New
Hampshire; Cal.ebStrong and George Cabot, Massachusetts;
Oliver Ellsworth and John Trumbull, Connecticut; Theodore
Foster and William Bradford, Rhode Island; Rufus King, New
York; .Tohn Rutherford, New .rersey; .Tames Ross and William
Bingham, Pennsylvania; Henry Latimer, Delaware; R. Potts,
Maryland; Humphrey Marshall, Kentucky; .racob Read, south
Carolina. All of these men, with the exception of two, represented the New England and Middle Atlantic states. some ot the
senators were absent on leave when the vote was taken. According to this tabulation, politically the North and Middle
East were favorable to the treaty without the twelfth article.
The people of these sections, however, were not so kindly
10 Ibid., 185o

-110disposed to the treaty as was their senators.
The nays were represented by a group ot "ir:reeon-,.
cilables" from the South who wanted no part of the treaty
whatsoever. They were the following men: Landon of New
Hampshire; Robinson, Vermont; Burr, New York; Brown, Kentucky;
Masons and Tazewell, Virginia; Bloodworth and Morton, North
Carolina; Butler, South Carolina; JaCkson, Georgia. The
senators from Vermont and New Hampshire were opposed to the
article pertaining to navigation and trade with the Indians.
The southern states stood together in voting against ratification, for several reasons: the way the debts were to be paid,
no further sequestration or confiscation ot debts, individual
rights were curbe4. by the ninth article, and no clause providing for the payment of the negroes carried away.
The secretary was ordered to lay the ratification
paper before the president.
on Friday, June 26, Livermore proposed,and Butler
seconded, 'That the resolution of the 8th instant, enjoining
secrecy upon the senate, with regard to the communications on
that day I!Ulde by the President, be rescinded; but that it be
nevertheless enjoined upon the senators not to authorize or

-111allow any publication in print, of the said communication, or
any article thereat.' 11 This was passed in the affirmative;
yeas l4, nays 12. It was moved by. Read to amend the original
motion by adding to it - 'But that it be nevertheless enjoined
upon the Senators not to authorize, or allow any eopy of the
said communication, or of any article thereof.' 12 This was
passed in the affirmative; yeas 14, nays 12; the question to
agree to the motion as amended was passed in the affirmative;
yeas 18, nays 9.
Before the injunction ot secrecy was lifted from
the Senate, senator Mason of Virginia obtained an inaccurate

copy of the treaty, and had it printed in the

Auro~a

Inte1li-

gencer(Pennsylvania). The people in the South praised Mason
for this action.
THE TREATY .AND THE EXECUTIVE

Arter washing'OO.n received notification that the
Senate ratified the treaty with the suspension of the twelfth
article, he became concerned about several questions which
arose by this action of the Senate. In order to obtain advice,
he sent the following letter to members or his cabinet, proposing these questions:
ll Ibid., 190.
l2 Ibid ••

-~12Phi~adelphia,

29 JUne, 1795

Sir,

I enc~ose to you a copy of the reso~ution
of the senate, ad vi sing that the late treaty
with Great Britain be ratified. Upon this
resolution ~wo questions arise.
First, is or is net that reolution
intended to be the final act of the Senate;
or do they expect, that the new article which
is proposed shall be submitted to them before
the treaty takes effect?
Secon~y, does or does not the constitution
permit the President to ratify the treaty without
submitting the new article, after it shal~ be
agreed to by the British King, to the Senate
for their further advice and consent?
I wishryou]to consider this subject as
soon as posslble, and transmit to me your opinion
in writing, that I may without delay take some
det'ini tive step upon the treaty. 15
It was decided, by all save Hamilton, that the president did
not have to submit the treaty to the senate again with the
new

artic~e

after England had consented to it.
The only way that Washington's view of the treaty

can be discerned was through his private and public correspondence. It will be necessary at this point to quote extensively from his letter to his cabinet and his :friends. He was
especially cont'idential with

Hami~ton,

and it was through these

letters that one can obtain a real insight as to the president'
real feelings about the treaty. He did not intend that these
~3 The Writings o:r George Washington, ed. by Worthington Ford,

G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1889-1893, XIII, 60. Hereafter
referred to as Washington- Writings.

-113letters be published, thus he would express himself freely.
The president was not entirely pleased with the
treaty - he had several objections to it, but they were overbalanced by its advantages. Before sending it to the senate,
he had resolved to

r~tify

it it it were approved by that body.

He felt that he was acting in entire. accordance with the
constitution- for he let it be his guide. He was criticized
tor undertaking the negotiation [_a treaty of commerce] without
the consent of the senate.

~he

Senate did, however, confirm

Jay 1 s appointment as envoy

extraordinary~

Washington acted

constitutionally throughout the entire negotiation and ratification of the treaty. He was especially concerned over the
unfavorable reaction of the public.
In a letter to Hamilton, which was private and
eonfidentia~,

Washington stated:
Philadelphia, 3

MY DEAR SIR,

JU~y,

1795.

It ia not the opinion of those who were
determined (before it was Rrowulgated) to
support or oppose it, that I mn solioitious
to obtain; for these I well know rarely do
more than examine the side to which they lean;
without giving the reverse the consideration it
deserves •••• My desire is to learn from
dispassionate men, who have a knowledge of the
subject, and abilities to judge of it, the

,

-114genuine opinion they entertain of each
article of the instrument and the result
of it in the aggregate. In a word, placed
on the footing the matter now stands, it is,
more than ever, an incumbent duty on me to
do what propriety, and the true interest of
this country shall appear to require at my
hands, on so important a subject, under such
delicate circumstances.
The treaty has, I am sensible, many
relations, which, in deciding thereon ought
to be attended to; - some of them too are of
an important nature. - I know also, that to
judge with precision, of its commercial
arrangements, there ought likewise to be an
intimate acquaintance with the various
branches of commerce between this country and
Great Britain as it now stands; - as it will
be placed by the treaty, - and as it may
effect our present, or restrain our future
treaties with other nations. 14
Here Washington was very interested in the commercials aspects
of the treaty, for he wanted to know whether the

t~eaty

placed

America on a more advantageous footing. He showed his interest
in the commercial interests of the country. He was criticized
for this by the people who felt that he should have been just
as concerned about other class interests. In this letter he
did not mention the other articles of the treaty or how they
affected the country in general.
In another private letter to Hamilton, Washington
criticized the
14 Ibid., 61.

co~~ercial

parts of the treaty especially

-115article three as it acted upon the trading interests of the
American merchants:
PHILADELPHIA, 13th July, 179 •
MY DEAR SIR,

The most obnoxious article {12th} being
suspended by the Senate, there is no occasion
to express any sentiment thereon. - I wish,
however, it had appeared in a different form. And altho' it is but said to presume that, no
further advantage c:COul.d have been obtained in
the 3d article, yet the exclusion ot the vessel&
belonging to the Uni~ed States from all the
'Seaports. Harbours, Bays, or Creeks ot His
Majesty,' when theirs are admitted into all
ours, to the highest Port ot entry, is not
marked w1 th reciprocity. - It may be urged and
truly, that under the existing regulations ot
the B. governmEilt, we are not, at this time
allowed those privileges; except when they
are made to subserve their own purposes: whilst
from Q.uebec (but how we are to get there I know
not,) and upwards, -the lakes, and waters
on their side of the line, are open to our
commerce, and that we have equal advantages in
the Indian t~de on both sides; except within
the limits of the Hudons's bay company.
All this looks very well on paper; but
I much question whether in it:s operation it
will not be found te work very much against
us.
My opinion ot this article therefore is,
that it would have been more tor our peace, if
not tor our interest, to have restrained the
traders ot both nations to their own side of
the line, leaving the Indians on each, to go to
whichsoever their interest, convenience, or
inclination, might pro~pt them. This woul6 have

-116thwarted the views of the British on the
Mississippi, whilst all the doors into
upper Canada• and the West ern Country
would have been as wide open to them,
as they are now made by the trea~
and no difficulty I am persuaded would
have been tound by our people, of introducing
goods across the line, at~er they had got
them to it, and the Posts possessed by us,
if this avenue should be found the most
convenient and cheapest. 15
Still another letter showed Washington's concern
over the commerce of the nation:
MOUNT VERNON, 29,July, 17.95.
MY DEAR SIR;

That it has received the most tortured
interpretation, and that the-writings against
it (which are very industriously circulated)
are pregnant of the most abominable w.tsrepresenta~ions, admits of no doubt; yet,
there are to be found, so far as my information extends, many well disposed men who
conceive, that in the settlement ot old
disputes, a proper regard to reciprocal
justice does not appear in the Treaty; ••••
In a word, that as our exports consist
chiefly of provisions and raw materials,
which to the manufeaturers in G. Britain,
and to their Islands in the West Indies,
affords employment and food; they must have
had them on our terms, if they were not to be
obtained on tneir own; whilst the im~orts
of' this country, offers the best mar et tor
their fabrics; and of course, is the principal
support of their manufacturers; but the
string which is most played on, because it

15 Ibid., 65.

-ll'l-

strikes with most force the popular ear,
is the violation, as they term it, of our
engagements with-France; or in other words
the predilection shown by that ins,trument
to G. Britain at the expence of the French
nation •••• it is the interest of the French
(whilst that animositf, or jealousies between
the two nations exist) to awil themselves
of such a spirit to keep us and G. Britain
at variance; and they wil~in my opini~
accordingly do it. 16
To Randolph, the secretary ot State, washington
expressed his deep anxiety over the reception of the :;,;reaty.
He was not worried as to how this reflected on himself, but
because the French could use this confusing situation to their
advantage:
MOUNT VERNON, 29,

.July, 179

MY DEAR SIR;

I rtew the opposition, which the treaty
is receiving from the meetings in different
parts of the Union, in a very serious light;
not because there ~s ~ weight in ~ of
the objections, wh1ch are made to it~an was
foreseen at first, for there are none in some
of them, and geosa misre~resentations in Oinirs;
nor as it respects mysel personally, tor this
shall have no influence on my conduct, plainly
percei v1ng, and I am accordingly preparing
my mind for it, the obloquy whiCh disappointment
and malice are collecting to heap upon me.
But I am alarmed on account of the effect it
may have on, and the advantages the French
government may be disposed to make of, the
spirit which is at work to cherish a belief in
them, that the treaty is calculated to favor
16 Ibid., 78. This was a private letter to Alexander Hamilton.
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G.B. at their expense •••• but, when they
see the people of this country divided,
and such violent opposition given to the
measures ot their own government pretendedly
in their favor, it may be extremely embarrassing to say no more of it.
To sum the whole up in a few words,
I have never, since I have been in the
administration of the government, seen a
crisis, which in my judgment has been so
pregnant of" interesting events, nor one
f"rom which more is to be apprehended,
whether viewed on one side or the other.
From New York there is, and I am tol.d
will fUrther be, a counter current; but
how f"ormidable it may appear, I know not.
If the same does not take place at Boston
and other towns, it will afford but too
strong evidence, that the opposition is
in a manner universal, and woul.d make the
ratification a very serious business
indeed.But, as it respects the FrenCh,
counter resolutions, even would, for the
reasons I have already mentioned, do
ltttle more than weaken, in a small degree,
the effect the other side would have. 17
In still another letter to Randolph he expressed his fears:
MOUNT VERNON, 31, JUly, 1795.
MY DEAR SIR,

• • • that the prejudices against 1 t ~reatYI
are more extensive than is generally imaginer
···• How should it be otherwise, when no
stone has been lett.unturned, that could impress on the minds of the people the most
arrant misrepresentation of facts; that their
rights have not only been neglected, but
absolutely sold; that there are no reciprocal
advantages Iii'"'"l'h e treaty; that the beneti ts
are all on the side of G.B.; and, that seems
to have had more weight with them than all
the rest, and was the most pressed, that the
1? Ibid., 80-81.

,...

'

treaty is made with the design to
oppress the FrenCh, in open violation
ot our treaty with that nation, and
contrary, too, to every principle of
gratitude and sound policy? ••• If the
treaty is ratified, the partisans of
the FrenCh (or rather of war and
confusion,) -will exei te themselves to
hostile measures, or at least to
unfriendly sentiments, if it is not,
there is no forseeing all the consequences which may follow, as it
respects G.B ••
It is not to be interred trom
hence, that I am or shall be disposed
to quit the ground I have taken, unless
circumstances more imperious than have
yet come to my knowledge should compel
it; for there is but one straight course,
and that is to seek truth and pursue it
steadily.
The form of the ratification requires
more diplomatic experience and legal
knowledge than I possess, or have the
means of acquiring at this place, and
therefore I shall say nothing about it. 18
PROVISION ORDER
While the friends of the treaty were trying to
muster opinions favorable to it, Britain renewed or seemingly
renewed her Order in Council of June
authorized Britaints navy

a,

1793. This order

to seize ships carrying provisions

to France. Because of this order Washington hesitated to give
his final ratification to the treaty. He gave expression to
these thoughts in a letter to Jay written August 31, 1795:
18 ~., 85.
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It has not been the smallest ot these
embarrassments, that the domineering
spirit of Great Britain should revive
again just at this crisis, and the
outrageous and insu~ting conduct of
some of her officers should combine
therewith to play into the hands of
the discontented and sour minds ot
those, who are friends to peace,
order, and friendship with all the
world; but this by the by.
The abject of this letter is to
pray you to aid me with suan hints,
relative to these points, which you
conceive to be fit subjects tor the
further friendly negotiations on the
trade with Great Britain, agreeably
to the recommendation of the Senate;
and which appear to have been in
contemplation by the concluding part
of the treaty signed by yourself and
Lord Grenville. 19·
This order was secret even as late as June 27, 1795, for it
was not even known·in London. It was communicated to cruisers
only, and was only known when captures brought it to light.
Josiah Neucomb threw a new light on the order when he claimed
that the order was not a renewal of the old one, but a secret
instruction to British captains:
'··· we, not judging it expedient to
continue tor the present the purchase
of the said cargoes ~eized corlij on
behalf of our government are pleased
to revoke the said article until our
further order therein, and to declare
that the same shall no longer remain
in force; but we strictly enjoin the
19 Ibid., 99.
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commanders of our ships of war and
privateers to observe the remaining
articles of the said instructions,
and likewise all other instructions
which we have issued and which still
remain in force.' 20
By this edict the old order was partially abandoned. The new
order was issued in 1795, and read as follows:
••• and ordered that commanders of
British ships of war {privateers
were not included) detain all ships
laden with corn or provisions bound
for France or to ports occupied by
French armies whenever the commanders
had reason to believe that such ships
were laden •on account of the said
per•ons (exercising the powers of
government in France) or of any of
His Majestyts enemies.• 21
The commanders were only to stop ships believed to be laden
with provisions headed for France. How this was possible
cannot be ascertained unless all ships were captured. Although
the wording of the new order was different than the old order,
in reality it was exactly similar, for American vessels, with
provisions for France, were being captured as in 1793.
1~.

Neucomb further stated:

Everything that was done refused to be
done, everything that was said on our
part involving the new instruction and
what resulted from it, was based on the
assumption, now known to be erroneous,
20 Josiah Neucomb, "New Lights on Jay's Treaty", The American
Journal of International Law, American Society of International Law, Concord, New Hampshire, 1934, 28, 685.
21 Ibid., 688.
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that the similarity referred to existed.
The outward manifestations were the same.
Provision vessels under our flag were
being seized by British cruisers. 22
This had an indirect bearing on the treaty, for
now it proved conclusively that Jay acquiesced in the principle
that provisions were contraband:
The worst of it was that the renewed
depredations apparently confirmed the
charge insisted upon by Madison and
insistently denied by Hamilton, that
Jay in the treaty had acquie$ced in
the British policy of provision
seizures, against which Jefferson had
argued so soundly that the British
Minister was unable to answer him;
and which no American could be sustained
in defending. Assuming, as everybody did,
that the secret instruction was similar
to the Order in Council of June 8, 1793,
it followed either that the British
were deliberately ignoring the treaty
on the thin excuse that it had not yet
been ratified; or that they de~ed Jay
to have made the concession charged
when he agreed to the ~anguage of
Article 18 at the treaty. 25
The importance of the woDding of this order was
important in another way for its effect on the treaty. Mr.
Neuoomb explained the significance of knowing the difference
in the provision orders:
••• you will observe that it was
founded on indisputable information,
22 Ibid., 587.
23 Ibid., this was quoted from the British Record Office,

FOreign Office, 5:9.

-123-

of the accuracy of which the American
Government especially can have no doubt,
that cargoes of provisions had in a very
great number of instances and to a very
large extent been actually purchased by
French agents in foreign countries, and
shipped tor France under fictitious names.
And as by the established Law of Nations
as expressly recognized by the American
Government, its cargoes of this description
would have been liable to seizure and
confiscation if no such instruction had
existed, the issuing of it cannot by any
construction be said to afford any reasonable
ground of complaint or even dissatisfaction.
Much less when it is considered that all
the vessels detained under this order have
been dealt with according to the precise
terms of the article contained in the
late Treaty, by whieh it expressly provided th14t the oonduct of the two nations
shall tor the present b! governed by
the rules there laid down. 24
This shift in the orders has escaped the notice
of historians. There was no document to prove that the British
borrowed from the instructions of .Tune, 1793. Pia.kering, the
Secretary of state, was notified ot this shift by Phineas
Bond. In my opinion

1~.

Neucomb stressed this shift too muah,

for the facts indicated that American ships were being seized
under the same circumstances as the ships that were seized
under the old order.
Marshall pointed out how important Washington
24 Ibid., 690, this was also quoted from the British Record
O??Ice, Foreign Office, 5:9.
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telt this order to be, for he hesitated in taking action for
the final ratification of the treaty unt11 the order was
~itted:

Apprehending that this order might be
construed as a practical construction
of the article in the treaty whien
seemed to favour the idea that provisions, though not generally contraband,
might occasionally become so, a construction in whica he had determined
not to acquiesce, the. president thought
it wise to reconsider his decision of
the result of this reconsideration,
there is no conclusive testimony. 25
CONCLUSION
In a letter to Randolph, Washington presented his
conclusions regarding the treaty:
MOUNT VERNON, 22, Ju}.y,

~795.

DEAR SIR,

The first, that is, the condition~ ratification (if the late order, which we have
heard of,, respecting provision vessels, is
not in operation,) may, on all fit occasions,
be spoken of as my determination, unless fr~
from any thing you have heard or met with
since I left you, it should be thought more
advisable to communicate further with me on
the subject. My opinion respecting the treaty
is the same now that it was, namely, not
favorable to it, but that it is 'better to
ratify it in the manner the Senate have
advised, and with the reservation already
mentioned, than to suffer matters to remain
as they are, unsettled. 25
25 John Marshal~, The Life of George Washington, C.P. Wayne,
Philadelphia, ~807, V, 519.
26 Washington-Writings, 69.
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The question respecting immediate ratification
was brought before the cabinet on August 12, 1795. John
Marshall's resume of th!s meeting will also serve as a conclusion for this chapter:
The secretary of state maintained
singly the opinion, that during the
existence of the provisipn order, and
during the war between Britain and
France, this step ought not to be
taken. This opinion did not· prevail.
The resolution was adopted to ratify
the treaty immediately, and to accompany
the ratification with a strong memorial
against the provision order, which should
convey in explicit terms the sense of the
Ameriean government on that subject. By
this course, the views of the executive
were happily accomplished. The order waa
revoked, and the ratifications or the
treaty were exchanged.
The president was most probably
determined to adopt this course by the
extreme intemperance with which the
treaty was opposed, and the rapid
progress which the violence was
apparently making. 27
Washington felt that as undesirable as the treaty
was, it was better than the prospects ot war. Professor Bemis
very pointedll and humorously brought out Washington's disapproval: "We uan imagine that when Washington decided to accept
the treaty, he kept it at arms length and with the other hand
closed his nostrils."

28

The president signed the treaty on

February 28, 1795 because there was no other course to follow.
27 Marshall, 633.
28

Smeriean Secretaries of State
Beiils I. Krio i? New York

s.

Diplomacy, ed. by
89.

OH.APTER IX
THE TREATY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES .

He the president shall have power, by
and with the advice and consent ot the
senate, to make treaties, provided twathirds ot the senators present concur. 1
TREATY -MAiaNG POWER

The above quotation placed in the hands ot the
Executive and the senate, the authority to make treaties. It
will be necessary to keep this quotation in mind in the discussion that is going to follow while the treaty was in the
House. It was necessary tor the treaty to appear on the rostrum

ot the House, since financial appropriations were necessary
{tor the salary ot the various commissioners and for the financing of the work or the commissions to settle the differences) in order to carry out the treaty. It was here that the
real opposition to the document was met, for the House more
accurately reflected the opinions of the people. Thus this
chapter and the next will be representative of the people.
Before discussing this aspect of the treaty, first
of all a clear understanding of the treaty-making power must
be given:
1 F. Ogg and P. Ray, Introduction to American Government,
D. Appleton co., New York, 1942, 991.
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Under the artieles of confederation,
Congress made treaties; and the framers
of the constitution at first thought ot
giving the power to the Senate. As,
however, the coneept of the presidency
grew in their minds, the opinion developed that it would be better to
assign treaty-making along with the
general management of the country's
foreign relations, to the chief executive, assoeiating with him the
Senate as an advising and restraining
council. The House of Representatives
was deliberately omitted from the plan
in the interest of 'secrecy and despatch,'
and the assent of two-thirds, rather than
a simple majority, in the senate was pro-.
vided tor in order to prevent treaties
from being made too lightly, and also
to give sectional interests like the
New England :risheries added protection
against being 'sold out.• 2
This was a precise account of the treaty-making power. There
was no mention made that the House was concerned in this
aspect of foreign relations. The constitution ommitted to say
anything about the conaurrenee or consent o:r the House in
appropriations necessary to ea.rry a treaty into effect. If this
particular phase of treaty-making had been specifically provided for in the constitution, many debates over the Jay Treaty
would have been unnecessary.
These debates were very lengthy, and cannot be
presented in their entirety in this work. The most important
2 Ibid., 644.
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arguments presented on both sides will be given consideration.
These opinions

~ould

be viewed in the light ot what has been

previously presented regarding the treaty-making powers. In
these debates Madison, Giles, Baldwin and Livingston, opposea
Smith, Harper, Sedgwick and Hillhouse, who presented the
Federalist point of view.
LIVINGSTON'S RESOLUTION
When Washington committed the treaty to Congress
on March 1, 1795, it seemed that "This was the signal in the
House of Representatives to let loose the pent up wrath
against this measure, whieh had only been restrained, until
official notice of its ~atifioation should be received." 3
On March 2, Livingston proposed the following
reaolution:
'That the President of the United Statea
be requested to lay before this House a
copy of the instructions to the Minister
of the United States, who negotiated the
Treaty with Great Britain, communicated
by his Message of the 1st of March,
together with the correspondence and
other documents relative to the said
Treaty.' 4.
~~.

Livingston averred that his purpose in asking for the

papers was for the 2ake of information, but it was a question
3 The Life and Corres..P.ondenae of Rufus King, ed. by Charles
King, G.P. Putnam's sons, New York, 189~, II, 39.
4 T.H. ~enton, Abridgment of Debates in Congress, John C. Revis,
D. Appleton &. co., NewcYork, 1857, I, 640. Hereafter referred to as Abridg. of Debates.

-129-

as to what point this information was to apply. He affirmed
that his object was

n~

an impeachment of the president,

unless when the papers were obtained they would make such a
step advisable. The House resolved i tselt into a Committee of
the Whole House to discuss the resolution.

Mr. Murray said that he was against the resolutio
for the following reasons:

Mr. MURRAY said, that he was against

the :resolution for two reasons. which
then struck his mind forcibly. The first
was the want. of a deola:ned object within
the acknowledged cognizance of the House;
the other was because he believed ~t was
designed as the groundwork of a very
dangerous doctrine, that the Houee had
a right to adjudge, to adopt, or to
rejeot Treaties generally, Had the
gentleman stated the objeot tor which
they called for the papers to be an
impeachment, or an inquiry into fraud,
as a oircumstanceattending the making
of the Treaty, the subject would be
presented under an aspect very different
from that whieh it had assumed. He
considered a Treaty, constitutionally
~ade, to be the supreme law ot the
land. The Treaty in view had been
negotiated and ratified, he thought
agreeably to the constitution. It has
been issued, by the PRESIDENT'S proclamation, as an act obligatory upon the
United States. If the House mean to go
into the merits ot that instrument, and
the information be called for with that
view, he should teel himself bound by the
constitution to give it every opposition. 5

5 Annals of congress, Gales and Seaton, Washington, 1849, 429.
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Mr. Lyman was also opposed to the motion:

If the resolution tended only to this
object anxiety allayed, it was effecting
a valuable purpose, but there was, he
said, another consideration of vast importance, which was, whether the Treaty
had encroached upon the Legislative
powers of the constitution. As to that
point, he would not admit the papers
could not be expected to give much light.
But if the House chould conceive their
constitutional powers extended to a
consideration of the subject, undoubtedly
they ought to be in possession of the
papers in question, and all the information
relative thereto. 6
Even Madison was no~ enthusiast of the motion
as it was first proposed: "The resolution, in the form in which
it was first presented, was liable to objec.ttion; the mover had
removed the objection in great measure; by adding an exception
to the papers

r~quested."

On

Maro~

7

7 Madison moved to modify or amend the

motion by adding: 'Except so muCh of the said papers as, in
his judgment, it may not be consistent with the interest of.
the United States, at this time to disclose.' 8 The amendment
lost by a vote of 37 to 47. Madison realized that all the
papers could not be had by the House because of the need tor
secrecy in foreign
6

.!.lli·,

7

.
Ibid., 4.38.

8 Ibid ••

428.

affairs~

The other members of the House

-131felt differently, however.

Mr. Smith presented another point of view regarding the papers pertaining to the treaty:
It would b~ placing him[the Executiv~
in a·situation which it was to be hoped
the Executive would not be placed in;
for if he sent them it was explicitly
saying, he had been negligent of his
duty in not communicating them before;
if he refused, it was setting up
department against department, a
situation of all others to be regretted. 9

Mr. Gallatin took the opposing side by stating:
••• - conceived that whether the House
had a discretionary power with respect
to treaties, or whether they were
absolutely bound by those instruments,
and were obliged to pass laws to carry
them.fully into effect, still there waa
no impropriety in calling for the papers. 10
Mr. Lyman and

r~.

Holland expressed their views on

this subject:
Mr. Lyman:
He was against the resolution now
on the table, as involving a doctrine,
in his opinion, not only inconsistent
with the principles of the constitution,
but also inconsistent with the laws of
nations •••• How far that House had a
right to exercise their Legislative
discretion and judgment relative to
carrying the Treaty into effect. 11
9 Ibid., 457.

10 Benton, 645.
11 ~., 658.

Mr. Holland:
The question is not whether the Treaty
is a good or bad Treaty, but it is
whether we have a right to exercise
our judgments upon it. Then,,without
any regard to the Treaty, we must be
governed by the rational construction
of the fundamental principles or
government. 12
some representatives viewed the resolution as a
stepping stone to a violation of the rights of the other
branches or the government. Others felt that the House was
obliged to carry the treaty, constitutionally made, into efteo •
several representatives introduced the theory that in Britain
the king had to show all papers relative to a treaty, to the
House of Commons before that body would pass the necessary
legislation for carrying the treaty into etfeot. This was an
absurd argument, for what Britain did in her parliamentary
procedure did not have 'tO be followed by America. America's
government was built upon a structure entirely different from
that of England, thus the comparison was rutile.
Mr. Williams stated that one of the reasons why
the House was not vested with the authority to make treaties
was for the purpose of secrecy, which was a necessity in
12 Ibid., 661.

foreign relations. Then, too, since the House was not conferred with either the power to alter or amend the treaty,
the papers were unnecessary. 13
The discussion on the call for the papers led
into a consideration of the question of, treaty-making. Here
again many of the arguments were very tautalogical.

A

few

o~

the more important ones will be presented here.
I~.

while

~.

Gallatin presented one phase of the argument,

Smith of South Carolina presented the Federalist

view:
1:v!r •

Gallatin:

The treaty-making power delegated to
the Executive may be considered as
clashing with that congressional
authority to regulate trade. The
question may arise whether a Treaty
made by the PRESIDENT and Senate,
containing regulations touching ·
objects delegated to Con~ess, can
be considered binding, without
congress passing laws to carry it
into e:tt'ec.t. 14

Mr. Smith:
The PRESIDENT and senate have, by
the constitution, the powers ot making
Treaties:, and the House have no agency
in them, excepting to make laws necessary
to carry them into operation.) he considered
13 Only the important arguments were presented, for they
set forth the central points upon which all of the other
one were based.
14 Benton, MO.
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the House as bound, in common with
their fellow-citizens, to do every thing
in their power to carry them into full
execution. He recognized but one exception
to this rule, and that was, when the
instrument was clearly unconstitutional.
In this case, he remarked, it had not
been said that the Treaty was unconstitutional.
By adopting the treaty the Executive sanctioned the work of his
agent.
·
Diplomatic transactions are in
all countries of a secret nature; in
the progress ot negotiation, many things
are necessarily suggested, the publication
of which may involve serious inconvenience
and disadvantage to the parties negotiating.
OUr constitution has, therefore, wt·sely
assigned this duty to the Executive, the
precedent attempted to be established is,
then, a dangerous one; for it not only
tends to alter the nature. ot the Government, but to endanger the interests of
the country. This is the first instance
of the kind since the establishmBnt of
the constitution the Executive has,
indeed: of his own accord, communicated
to us such papers relative to negotiations,
as appeared to him proper to lay before
us, and as might show the public he was
pursuing the requisite steps for obtaining
redress. But there is not one solitary
instance on the .rournals, of a movement on
our side to obtain such papers, where he
has not deemed it proper on his part to
transmit them. In this case, the PRESIDENT, has communicated the Treaty, without any
papers accompanying it. This is an evidence
of his sentiments. Had he thought it his
duty to have communicated the instructions
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and correspondence, he would unquestionably
have done it. It has been said that he would
refuse a compliance with sueh call, if he
thought it improper; but this was no reason
for making a wan~on call; ••• if, after this,
they are requested, and he sends ':them., it
will .be an avowal., on his part, that he
committed an error in not sending them at
first, or that they have been extorted from
him. This call is then calculated to place
him in a painful dil~; he must either
resist the application ot this House, or
surrender essential Executive rights.
In the business of Treaties, the
constitution has provided no other c~eck
than the requisite concurrence of the
Senate, and the right of impeachment by
this House; unless, therefore, this call
is predicted on an intention to impeach,
and so stated and understood, it is an
encroachment on the Executive, and will.
be attended with serious consequences. 15

Mr. Smith's

argumen~

was better prepared than Mr. Gallatin's.

He anal.yzed every point in a very logical manner, and used
the constitution as his guide. He carefully pointed out the
necessity of keeping the treaty-maki:r;J.g power in the senate
and the E:xecuti ve. Since the papers were not being asked for
with the intention of an impeachment,

th~

were not necessary

in order to carry the treaty into effect. The Senate had

gi~en

ratification to the document,. and the president intended to
sign it, therefore, it was not up to the House to consider
the treaty in any of its aspects. Mr. Smith's argument waa

15 Ibid., 541.
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presented in its entirety because of his excellent ideas
about this aspect of government.
As opposed to :Mr. Smith, Mr. Nicholas presented
the following:
This must be considered as a sufficient
answer to the gentleman from south Carolina,
when he said, that the PRESIDENT and Senate
possessed the treaty-making power; for the,y
possessed it with qualification, in matters
of money; and unless the House chose to
grant that money, it was so far no Treaty. 16

Mr. Giles agreed with Mr. Nicholas with regard to treaties
needing appropriations:
The checks on the Trea ty-mald.ng power
he considered as divisable into two
classes; the first, consists in the
necessary concurrence of the House to
give efficacy to the Treaties; which
concurrent power they derive trom the
enumeration of the legislative powers
of the House. Where the Treaty-making
power is exercised, it must be under the
reservation; that its provisions, so
tar as they interfere with the specified
powers delegated to Congress, must be
so far submitted to the discretion of
that department of Government.
The other cheek over the Treatymaking power, he noticed, was the power
of making appropriations, the exercise
of which is specifically invested in
Congress •••• This is no doubt intended
as a check in addition to those possessed
by the House. It is meant to enable the
House, without the concurrence of the
16 Ibid., 642.

-137other branches, to check, by refusing
money, any misehiet in the operations
carrying on in any department of the
Government.
If the PRESIDENT, said Mr. Giles,
can, by the assistance of a foreign
power, legislate against the rights
of the House to legislate, and his
proceedings are to be binding on the
House, it necessarily destroys their
right to the exercise of discretion. 17

Mr. Findlay also presented a very logical argument in the
following:

The Treaty-making power is not vested
in Congress; the negotiating part of
making Treaties is partly of an Exexuctive nature, and can be most
conveniently exercised by the department,
and is, therefore, vested in the PRESIDENT
and Senate. The PRESIDENT' shall have the
power to make Treaties, two-thirds of the
Senate agreeing therewith.
[Regarding the argument that the president
had no authority in negotiating a commercial
treati\ The power of making Treaties is
admittied to be so extensive as to emb~ace
all subjects arising under the law of
nations, for securing amity and friendship
betwixt nations, and for the mutual protection of the citizens in their correspondence with each other. Authority for
this purpose is not vested in Congress
among the enumerated powers, but expressly
given to the PRESIDENT and Senate; therefore,
Treaties to this extent, ratified under
their authority, are the l~ws of the land
according to the constitution.
The powers specifically vested in
Congress are so explicitly checked and
guarded as to form an unequivocal limitation to the Treaty-making power, when it

17 Ibid., 655-656.

-138extends to powers specifically vested
in the Legislature, consisting of the
Senate and House of Representatives,
with the approbation of the PRESIDENT. 18

Mr. Hillhouse felt that the House should examine
every treaty when asked to carry it into effect; on the other
hand, he did not consider the House as having a constitutional
right

~o

interfere in making treaties, or that a treaty needed

concurrence of the House to make it the law of the land. He
was under the impression

that treaties were exactly on the

same tooting as laws in their operation on previous laws, that
is, suspending and repealing such as were repugnan~. 19
'I'he House voted on the Livingston Resolution on
March 24.. The Resolution was passed in the committee of the
Whole House by a vote of 61 to 38 - a majority ot 23. Then
the House passed the resolution with a vote of 62 yeas to 37
nays.
WASHINGTON'S REPLY
The Resolution was placed before the president,
and after much deliberation {tor this would be establishing
a new and somewhat dangerous precedent} Washington refused to
send the papers. A part of his reply read:
18 Ibid., 668.
19 Ibid., 90.

-139To admit, then, a right in the House
of Representatives to demand and to
have, as a matter of course all the
papers respecting a negotiation with
a foreign power would be to establish
a dangerous precedent.
It does not occur that the inspection
of the papers asked for can be relative to
any purpose under the cognizance of the
House of Representatives except an impeachment which the resolution has not
expressed. 20
The instructions were not sent to the House, and according to
~~.

Bowers, the president was wise in not sending them:
Meanwhile, the papers should not be
sent because the instructiams to Jay
would 'do no credit to the Administration.'
some would disappoint and inflame the
people. 21

The only instruction that would probably inflame the people
would be the one concerning the opening of the West Indies te
~erican

trade. Washington established a precedent, in

tha~,

whenever the House asked for papers, the,y were to be furnished
only at the discretion of the chief executive.
BLOUNT'S RESOLUTION
When the president refused to send the papers
relative to the Treaty, Blount, in retaliation, proposed the
following resolution:
20 Ibid., 693. This entire letter is printed in Appendix II.
~also the private letter to Hamilton explaining further
Washington's reasons for refusing to send the papers
(Appendix III).
21 Bowers, 298.
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'Resolved, That it being declared by the
second section of the second article of
the constitution ••• , the House of Representatives do not claim any agency, in
making Treaties; but, that when a Treaty
stipulates regulations on any of the
subjects submitted by the constitution
to the powers of congress, it must depend,
for its execution, as to such stipulations,
on a law or laws to be passed by congress.
And it is the constitutional right and duty
of the House of Representatives, in all
such cases, to deliberate on the expediency
or inexpediency of carrying such a treaty
into etteot, and to determine and act thereon,
as, in their judgment, may be mc:st conducive
to the public good.
'Resolved. That it is not necessary to
the propriety of any application from this
House to the Executive, for information
desired by them, and which may relate to
any constitutional functions of the House,
that the purpose for which such information
may be applied; should be stated in the
application. 22
The executive would then know the reason for wanting such
papers, and would probably be more amenable to sending them.
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Vfhole House,
and after a short debate, affirmed by a vote of 57 to 35,

~

right to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of
carrying a treaty into effect, and to determine and act as in
their judgment may be most conducive to the public good.
The president and the House were now completely at issue.
22 Benton, 696.
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EXECUTION OF THE TREATY
·Mr. Hillhouse submitted a resolution providing
that the treaty be carried into effect: "Resol'Ved, That 1 t is
expedient to pass the laws necessary to carry into effect the
treaty lately concluded between the United states and the king
of Great Britain." 23 Mr. Maclay of Pennsylvania submitted a
resolution to the opposite effect. The question was to decide
which one should be discussed first. Madison preferred the
one suggested by Hillhouse, because the burden of the affirmative would be placed on the adversary, and this was an advantage in a debate. Since Jay's Treaty was the first treaty
to be made with a foreign nation under the new government, the
treaty-making power was under scrutiny.
The treaty was discussed in its many aspects.
the arguments expounded were similar to the ones used by the
various writers of the time. These objections have been.discussed, thus 1t will be unnecessary to repeat them now. The
new arguments that were given, however, will be discussed,
especially as they bring out the sectional interests.
Mr. swanwick, being a merchant, explained in

detail the reasons why the merqhants favored the treaty:
23

Works of Fisher Ames, II, 37.
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Ull.favorable to commerce, why are the
merchants so much in favor ot it.
They explain the reason themselves.
They are influenced by the present rather
than future interests. Five million of
spoliations they look to the Treaty to
repay; their prop~rty afloat, they fear
to be taken, and war they· dread; but '
is there really weight in these arguments?
I am ••• interested ••• in shipping, and
have suf':tered the loss ot one of my cargoes
at Bermuda, for which my undarwriters have
made me only a partial allowance; but I
neither dread any war on the part of
England, situated as she now is, nor
expect any payment of my loss from the
Treaty ••••
••• and the oomndssioners on
spoliations are to act in London merely
as arbitrators of the law at nations, on
wh~ our claims of spoliations is at best
but a very uncertain dependence. The
merchants in sundry parts of the United
states having thought it so, have claimed
the interference of Congress in advancing
them money, they rather doubted getting
any where else.
I judge it on its own merits, and
these must lead me to vote for the proposition to suspend appropriations, especially
in a moment when our seamen continue to be
impressed and our ships to be taken. 24

Mr. Giles, in discussing articles six and ten,
brought out some interesting points:
••• this assumption of debt, without any
obligation tor so doing, was extremely
improper, particularly when it is recollected that this article sweeps away all
24 Benton, 710.
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acts of limitation, and relates to the
whole extensive sense or business
carried on in the United States from
the extremes of New Hampshire to the
extremes of Georgia, for an unlimited
time before the Revolutions ••• but if
he were to choose between indemnification
to the American merchants for recent
spoliations committed upon their commerce,
or the payment of these debts, he should
not hesitate to prefer the first alternative;
because to that there were known limits;
to the other there was not, nor any date
for calculation under the mode of adjustment
prescribed by the Treaty. 25
The tenth article:
British subjects have great sums, both
in public and private funds in the Uni~ed
States. American citizens have little or
no property in public or private funds
in Great Britain. Hence the evident and
substantial inequality of this reciprocal
stipulation. On the other hand, Ameriaan
citizens have a great share of property
on the water, with very little naval
protection, and of course subject to
the naval superiority of Great Britain.
It, therefore, Great Britain had
stipulated, in case of war that in consideration of a refusal on the part of
the United States, to sequestrate property of British subjects upon land, she
would not molest the property of American
citizens upon water. There would have been
a substantial, instead of a nominal reciprocity; as the article now stands there
is an important right conceded, and no
compensation obtained. 26
25

Ibid., 716.

26 Ibid., 717.
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This point was very well explained by

~~.

Giles, and certainly

the article would have been reciprocal if Britain would have
promised to protect American property at sea, as America waa
to protect British property on land.
After much discussion "pro" and

"con~,

Mr.

Griswold rose to a point of order so to speak, by saying:
That in his opinion, the extensive
view which the committee were taking
of the merits of the Treaty with Great
Britain was unwarranted by the Constitution of the United States; that he
did not believe any part of the ~reaty
making power had been delegated to the
House of Representatives; and that the
committee might with as much propriety
examine the merits of the constitution
itself, for the purpose of deciding
whether they would execute it or not,
as to examine the Treaty in the manner
which had been adopted in the committee. 27

Mr. Gallatin expressed in a few words the hysteri
in which the country was involved:
He could not help considering the
cry of war, the threats of a dissolution of Government, and the present
alarm, as designed for the same purpose
that of making an impression on the
fears of being involved in a war, that
the negotiation with Great Britain had
originated; under the impression of
fear, the Treaty had been negotiated and
signed; a fear of the same danger, that
of war had promoted the ratification;
27 Ibid., 735.
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and now, every imaginary mischief
which could alarm our fears, was
conjured up, in order to deprive
us of that discretion, which the
House thought. they had a right to
exercise, and in order to force
us to carry the Treaty into effect. 28
Fisher Ames of Massachusetts made his famous
speech in behalf of the treaty, even though he vehemently
opposed it. By his oration he converted a number of his
colleagues over to the pro-treaty group. His speech was very
eloquent, for he appealeQ to the patriotiwa of his fellow
representatives to pass the necessary legislation to earry
through the treaty. Throughout the entire speech his patriotis
rang through almost every word, tor he tried with all of the
oratorical eloquence he had to get the others to join the
"bandwagon". 6 ome e:xeerpt s will now be given:
Indeed, so prompt are these feelings,
and, when once roused, so difficult to
pacify, that, if we could prove the
alarm was groundless, the prejudice
against the appropriations may remain
on the mind, and it may even pass for
an act of prudence and duty to negative
a measure which was lately believed by
ourselves, and may hereafter be misconceived by others to encroach upon the
powers of the house. Prineiples that bear a
remote affinity with usurpation on those
powers will be rejected, not merely as errors,
but as wrongs. Our sensibility will shrink
28

ill!·,

740.
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from a post where it is possible it
may be wounded, and be inflamed by
the slightest suspicion of an assault.
It will be impossible, on taking
a fair review of the subject, to justify
the passionate appeals that have been
made to us to struggle for our liberties
and rights, and the solemn exhortations
to rej.ect the proposition, said to be
concealed in that on your table to
surrender them forever. In spite of this
mock solemnity, I demand, if the house
will not concur in the measure to execute
the treaty, what other course shall we take?
How many ways of proceeding lie open before
us?
In the nature of things, there are
but three: we are either to make the treaty,
and to observe it, or break it. It would
be absurd to say we will do neither. If I
may repeat a phrase already so much abused,
we are under coercion to do one of them;
and we have no power, by the exercise of
our discretion, to prevent the consequence
of a choice.
By refusing to act, we choose: the
treaty will be broken and fall to the
ground •••• In ease we reject the appropriation, we do not secure any greater liberty
of action, we gain no safer shelter than
before from the consequences ar the decision •••• It is neither just nor manly
to complain that the treaty-making power
has produced this coercion to act. It is
not the art ot the despoti~ of that power,
it is the nature of things, that compels. 29
He was saying, in effect, that to pass the necessary legislation was the best alternative. Nothing eould be gained by
refusing, and much might be lost. He continued:
29 Ames, 40-41.

-147On this theme, my emotions are unutterable.
If I could find words for them, if my
powers bore any proportion to my zeal,
I would swell my voice to such a note
or remonstrance, it should reach every
log-house beyond the mountains. I would
say to the inhabitants, wake from your
false security; your cruel dangers, your
more cruel apprehensions are soon to be
renewed; the wounds, yet unhealed, are
to be torn open again; in the daytime,
your path through the woods will be
ambushed; the darkness of midnight will
glitter with the blaze of your dwellings.
You are a father - the blood of your sons
shall fall in your cornfield. You are a
mother - the warwhoop shall wake the
sleep of the cradle. 30

Ames was certainly appealing to the patriotism of the representatives when he painted such pictures or dark forebodings
(as the last paragraph indicated). His examples were very
abstract.
In conclusion he really burst forth with his
eloquence:
Let us not hesitate, then, to agree
to the appropriation to carry it into
faithful, execution. Thus we shall save
the faith of our nation, secure its
peace, and diffuse the spirit of
confidence and enterprise that will
augment its pro~perity •
••• Profit is every hour becoming
capital. The vast crop of our neutrality
is all see wheat, and is sown again to
swell, almost beyond calculation, the
30 Ibid., 64.
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future harvest of prosperity; and in
this progress, what seems to be fiction,
is found to fall short of experience. 31
Every representative was moved by this stirring speech at the
time, but when the vote was taken this oratory was forgotten.
Professor Channing summed up Ames' speech in
this way:
He declared that the opposition to the
treaty was political, was not based upon
the provisions of the instrument but was
due to the desire to inflame the public
passions against the government. The opposition was not to this treaty, but to
any treaty with Great Britain. None should
be made with a monarch or despot, there
would be no naval security while these
sea robbers domineer on the ocean. 32
When the motion was voted upon in the Committee
of the House, the vote was divided 49 to 49; it remained for
the chairman, Mr. Muhlenburg to decide. He voted for the resolution so that it could go to the House. In the House the
vote stood; yeas 51, and nays 48. The necessary appropriations
were passed on April 29, by a majority vote of three. It was
an expensive victory for the Federalists because the majority
of the country was on the other side.
The House only had to appropriate a sum of
90,000 dollars- thus it was not the money, but the principle
behind the appropriations that was so important.
31 Ibid., 70.
32 Channing, 146.

CHAPTER X

THE TREATY AND

THE

PUBLIC

Sel.dom has any measure of our
Government awakened such convulsions of popular feeling
as did the Jay Treaty, which,
surrendering our righteous and
immediate demands, yet saved
our future. 1
HUMAN REASON

Every author agreed that the major reason for
opposing the treaty was the commercial clauses, and the
failure to receive redress for American grievances. The opponents asserted that the financial and commercial interests
wanted to form profitable connections with England, and thus
this would mean coming to terms with the Tories whom the
farmers had fought in the Revolution. 'I'he sectional antagonisms
between capitalism and

agrariani~

were beginning to take deep

root.
Mr. Beard said:
And as every one ~ows also, Jay
succeeded in negotiating a trea~y
which gained several concessions
favorable to the mercantile interests
of the North, though falling tar short
1 A.J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall, Houghton Mifflin
Co., Boston, 1916, II, 117.
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of their reasonable expectations,
and at the same time afforded no
consolation to the sout~ at all. 2
The merchants and shippers were opposed to the
treaty at first, but began to support the administration "When Hamilton thus made it clear that war not only meant a
destruction ot eapitalistio enterprises and interests, but a
possible social war which would make Shay's rebellion appear
trivial in·comparison." 3 Then, too, this commercial class
felt that the illegal seizures by England would continue it
the treaty was not accepted, and there was a chance to receive
compensation tor the losses already sustained on shipping.
The insurance companies had stopped business because ot the
seizures. The merchants had an opportunity to gain economically
by the treaty, so they thought. What assurances they had that
England would stop the seizure-s because Am.eriea ratified the
treaty were negligible.
The commotion began at Boston and
seemed to rush through the union
with a rapidity and violence which
set human reason and common sense
at defiance. The first effort was
to deter the President from ratifying
the instrument - the n~t to induce
Congress to refuse the necessary
appropriation. 4
2 O.A. Bear4, Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy,
Macmillan co., New York, 1915, 282.
3 Ibid., 288.

ot John Marshall, ed. by John s.
Adams, University of Miehigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1937, 16.

4 .An Autobiographical Sketch
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attempt will be made to show why the various

sections of the country opposed the treaty. The most important
reasons were that the treaty had a detrimental effect either
economically or politically.
NEW ENGLAND

The New Englanders gradually decided to support
the treaty for they definitely had something to gain by so
doing.
The Maritime New Englanders, who had
begun by an unreflecting hatred ot
the Treaty, soon came to see, its
solid advantages tor them - a share
in the Rritish East India trade, and
indeed, the avoidance of war itself
with Great Britain. 5
The fear of war was an obsession with the people of New
England, ·for the shipping interests had the most to lose, sine
their cargoes would be seized without indemnification.
All in New England, however, were not convinced
of the advantages offered. The people of Boston held the first
mass meeting in protestation of the treaty. They drew up a
protest,

whi~

was sent to the president, listing their reasons

for opposition. These people were not only protesting against
the treaty, but also against national men and measures.
5 Mowat, 28.
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Aacording to Rufus King there would have been no meeting of
the people if one,Jarvis ( a man writing under a pseudonym),
had remained silent. The writers of the time felt that the
town meeting in Boston was a manifestation of the common
people.
In a letter to Rufus King, Charles Gore stated:
• • • so far as I aan"" lea:cn the temper
of the country on the treaty, it is
right; and so it certainly is in all
our seaports, Boston excepted; where
the mob, doubtless instigated by the
same men, who occasioned the town
meeting is continually attempting to
burn the treaty, Mr. Jay's effigy,
and to do other acts of violence. 6
This point was further proved when a resolution
of the Boston Chamber of Commerce was composed and sent to the
president. In this, Boston approved the treaty, but this
group was made up of influential and wealthy men, with the
merchants in the majority:
motion was then made in the words
following, viz. Resolved, as the
opinion of the chamber, That the
recommendation of the senate to
the president of the United States,
to ratify the treaty, as amended by
than, was wide and prudent; because
it settles 1n a fair and amicable
manner points of difference between
the two nations, which must otherwise
A

6correspondence of Rufus King, II, 31.
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necessarily subject our country to·
humiliating submission to British
impositions and injuries, or induce
a war. with all its horrors and
distresses, to seek redress; and
because, when considered collectively,
the tendency of the treaty must be to
promote and extend rather than to
injure and restrain, our commerce. 7
In reply to this approbation, Washington showed
his profound interest in the commercial classes by the following letter:
Sir,
I have received your letter of the
13th instant, covering a copy of the
dissent, of a number of citizens of
Boston, expressing their disapprobation
ot the vote adopted at a late meeting
in that town, relative to the treaty •••
and also a copy of the proceedings of
the Boston chamber of commerce, on the
same subject.
While I regret the diversity of
opinion which has been manifested on
this occasion, it is a satisfaction to
learn, that the commercial part of my
fellow citizens, whose interests are
thought to be most direct~y affected,
so generally consider the treaty, as
calculated, on the whol.e,. to procure
important advantages to our country.
This sentiment, I trust, will be axtended in proportion, as the provisions
of the treaty become well understood.
With due respect, I am. Sir,
Your obedient,
Go. washington.
·united States, 22~ August, 1'195. 8
7 Am. Rem., I, 129.

8 Ibid., II, 219.

-154-

What were the sentiments of the newspapers? As
usual one of the Boston papers favored the treaty, while the
other one disapproved or it.

An

example from each will be

given. The Federalist was a writer who challenged each and
every reason drawn up by the people of Boston against the
treaty. He wrote tor the Boston Centinel as follows:
The merchants of l.!assachusetts will
consider, it they are willing to
surrender all claim to their property
captured by the British - to saddle
themselves with an Indian war, at the
annual expense of a million dollars,
in a vain attempt, to gain, by force,
indemnity for a few slaves, once the
property ot their southern brethren. 9
This writer's contempt for the South can be plainly discerned,
and his picture seemed to be a little exaggerated.
From the Boston Chronicle - a Republican wrote
an open letter to the president, the grammatical construction
of which could stand improvement:
But, strange to say, your ambassador
has destroyed the very ground upon
which your neutrality proclamation
was founded, and has made a treaty
in direct violation of it. You mentioned
the modern law, and on the contrary
he has expressly declared the reverse.
You ·was fyler~ so particular on this
point, as to italiaise the term
'modern'; but ~n opposition to this
9 Ibid., II, 247.
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ancient law or-nations, which is, no
more, no less than the particular law
ot Britain.
·
You was [ilerEil either mistaken in
your proclamation, or 1~. Jay must be
guilty ot acting contrary to his instructions.
We request of you then, sir,
to let us know the reasons, why you
cannot. vindicate your \rHilary conduct,
before we are obliged o accede to the
propriety or Mr. Jay's nefociation.
If you was [wer~ preoipi ta e in your
proclamation of guaranteeing to the
United States, their neutrality, on
the 'modern law of nations' - if
you was (wereJequally nasty in declaring
that Mr. Jay was sent to vindicate,
with firmness, the rights of the
United States - if these things were
done without mature deliberation, and
you are now obliged to retreat, 'we
the people,' as friends to ytu' and to
themselves, would-thank you o let them
kriow the reasons, why you have altered
your sentiments. 10
· George Cabot, in writing to Ru:t"us King, gave an
inkling as to how the treaty was being received in other parts
of Massachusetts. Here Cabot probably did not take in a genera
overall view of the people, for he limited it to what he
termed the respectable part of the community:
With a view to ascertain the state
of public opinion & to contribute
my mite towards forming it rightly
in other parts of the state, I attended
10 Ibid.t II, 142.
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gratified to perceive that sensible
and virtuous men from other quarters
resented the proceedings ot Boston, so
that, it I were to judge from the
evidence of that day, I shou'd pronounce
that the sober sense of Massachusetts
approves the treaty.
OUr mercantile men have learnt
something more of our rights and the
rights ot the other nations than they
knew formerly, but they have yet t.o
learn that the commerce of the u.s.
is not such as wou'd enable us to
dictate the terms on whiah an intercourse is to be held with the nati~s
of Europe. 11
In Lexington, Massachusetts the people held a
town meeting on August 13, 1795, and atter reviewing the
treaty could find no civil or commercial privileges; on the
contrary, it deprived them of benefits as citizens of the
United states.
Now in viewing the repercussions in other parts
of New England, the various opinions can be shown:
Still another blow fell to the
Federalists when senator John
Langdon of New H~pshire, who
had supported Hamilton's financial
policies deserted on the treaty.
The merchants of Portsmouth a sacred cla.ss with the Hamiltonians shared in the general protest. 12
11 King, 18. This letter was written from Brookline, Massachusetts, July 25, 1795.
12 Bowers, 282.
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sole topic of the conversation, there
were no public meetings. 13
In Connecticut, where the preachers,
Professors, politicians had the people
cowed, there was scarcely a whimper. 14
At

Newport~

Rhode Island, on August 19, the

treaty was denounaed in a report to the people by a committee
(chosen by the people}:
Your committee would further observe,
that the treaty contains many sentences
ot doubtful construction; that it is
deficient of the reciprocity, which
ought to be the basis of all contracts;
that it is an infraction of the :friendship
and gratitude whioh·the republic of France
may justly .claim from the United States,
and that it may be ruinous to the agriculture,
manutactures, and commerce ot the United
States. 15
MIDDLE ATLANTIC STATES
The treaty met with full opposition in the Middle
Atlantic states. In Philadelphia a group ot ships-carpenters
burned Jay in effigy. He was also portrayed as holding a
balance in one hand, and on the light end was written "Liberty
and Independenaeof America"; on the heavier end was "British
Gold"; in the other hand Jay held the treaty, and from his
mouth came the words "Pay me what I demand, and I will sell
16
you my country."
13 Ibid.,
14 Ibid., 283.
15

1 6 Latane and Wainhouse, 93.
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said that the merchants in Philadelphia bowed to the constitutional authority and devotion to the president. He explained
this sudden about face in a letter to Monroe:
There is good reason to believe that
many subscriptions were obtd by the
Banks, whose directors solicited them
and bt the influence or Br calitalists.
In Ba timore Charleston, & ot er commercial towns, except Philada, New York,
and boston, no similar proceeding has
been attainable. Acquiesenoe has been
inculcated with the more success by
exagserated pictures of the public
?rosperitz, an appeal to the popular
eeiiag for the President, and :the bugbear
ot war;sti11, however, there is little
doubt that the real sentiment of the
mass of the community is hostile to the
treaty. 17
Whether this was true or not could not be ascertained by the
author. It was difficult to understand why the merchants

.

sudden~y

favored the document.
Washington, writing to one James Ross, in August,

1795, criticized the people of the seaport towns in this way:
PHILADELPHIA, 22 August, 1795.
DEAR SIR,
The seaport towns, or rather parts of
them, are involved, and are endeavoring as
much as in them lies to involve the community at large, in a violent opposition to the
17 The Writings of .Tames Madison, ed. by Gaillard Hunt,
G.P. Pub&Dl!s sons, New York, 1.906, VI, 259-2.60. This
letter was copied exactly as was printed in this work.
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ratified as far as the measure depends
upon me. The general opinion, however,
as far as I am .able to come at it is,
that the current is turning.
If one could belie~e that the
meetings, which have taken place,
spoke the general sense of the people
on the m~asure they condemned, it might
with truth be pronounced, that, it is
difficult to bear prosperity as adversity,
and that no stipulation or condition in
lite can make them happy. 18
Handbills were issued in New York denouncing the
treaty, and asking the nitizens to attend a meeting at the
Federal Hall to consider it. Hamilton attended with Rufus
King, intending to defend the treaty, but when he attempted
to make a speeah he was greeted with hisses and was stoned
from the platform..
The cry "Damn J"ohn Jay, damn everyone who won't
damn J"ohn J"ay. Damn everyone who won't sit up all night with
a candle in their window damning John J"ay", became a very
popular utteranae. There were many other anti-treaty toasts
at dinners, one of which went as tallows:
1. Clip't wings, lame legs, the pip and
an empty crop to all Jays.
2. May this cage made for the American
eagle prove a trap for the King birds
and J"ays.
5. Mr. J"ay and his treaty 'be forever
politically damned.'
4. May John J"ay enjoy all the pleasures ot
purgatory. 19
18 Washington- Writin5s, 94.
19 R. lfeEl:roy, The Pathway to Peace, Ivlacmillan Co., New York,
1927 . 90
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The New York Chamber of Commerce voted its approval of the document, but as in Boston, it was a vote of the
merchants. While all or this opposition to Jay and his treaty
was taking place in New York, Jay was elected governor of that
state two days before hia arrival in America.
In New Jersey a mass meeting was held at Trenton
in the State House on Augu.st 20, l?95, and the treaty was denounced in this manner:
'••• degrading to the national honordangerous to the public interest - and
destructive of the agricultural and
commercial view of the United states.
Further resolved That the citizens
of Trenton and its vicinity ••• do, upon
the most cool and dispassionate consideration,
disapprove of the aaid treaty, and hope,
by this public expression of their sentiments,
to prevent, as far as possible, its ratification by our supr~e Executive.' 20
Other township meetings in New Jersey vehemently
presented denunciations of the treaty - important ones being
from Bordenton, Blackb.orse, and Reckless:
lst. Resolved, That the very preamble
of the treaty ftlls us with mortification and astonishment, in as much
as it abandoned the high claims, the
positive losses, and that honorable
reparations demanded throughout the
union, and so explicitly declared by
our chief magistrates, as necessary to
be insisted upon, and which were held
20 Am. Rem., II, 209.
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expected, on his appointment of
an envoy extraordinary, to Great
Britain for that purpose, only.
3d. R~solved, That we do not
comprehend the policy whi~h leads
us, from the love and protection
of a sincere, powerfUl, and friendly
nation:France, into the arms of an
old, inveterate, unalterable foe;
tram wham we have received nothing
but injury, duplicity, and insult. 21
Delaware was not excepted in its opposition to
the document. The people drew up a

Memorial to George

W~shing

ton, asking him not to ratify it, and thereby promote the
happiness ot his constituents. The reasons given in this
Memorial were similar to the ones presented by the other peopl •
Kentueky also joined in the cry of opposition.
Since Kentucky was an inland state, she was dependent upon
the Mississippi for navigation and commerce, thus her reasons
for opposition centered against the use of the Mississippi
by the

~ritish:

"··· because it has let the subjects or this

hostile and treacherous government into a participation of
our right to navigate the Mississippi, and has thereby dispelled every hope of obtaining an amicable adjustment of our
differences with Spain on that subject. " 22 Their objections
were centered around states' rights and a dislike for Britain.
21 Ibid., I, 140.
22 Ibid., II, 259.
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SOUTHERN STATES
The SoQth joined the other two sections

or

the

country in opposing the work of Jay. Since the south represented the agricultural interests of the country, she had
nothing to fain from the treaty. If article twelve were
adapted, her

shi~ents

of cotton would be curtailed, just

when cotton was coming into its own. Then, too, she was to
receive no compensation

~or

the slaves, which she considered

a part of her property. The North, however, would eventually
receive compensation for the seizure of the ships by Britain
(if the commissioners decided in favor or Amerioa, that is).
Apparently and from all indieations in the provisions of the
treaty, the administration was taking care of the northern
interests at the sake of the south, or so it seemed to the
southerners.
The citizens of Baltimore composed the

~Baltimore

Addresstt to the president and thus voiced their protests:
we, the undersigned citizens or
the United States, inhabitants of
Baltimore town, beg leave respectfully
to represent, that the treaty lately
negociated with Great Brit~in ••• had
excited in our minds the most serious
apprehension and alarm for the interest
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and safety of our canmerce, the
rights of our fellow citizens,
and the dignity of our government.
Our territory and frontier
posts ••• are to be surrendered at
an unneeessarily distant period a remote hope of recovery, after
much expense and perplexity in the
usual mode of 1 egal proceedings and
much injury from the depreciation
of their e.api tals is the only compensation proeured for our suffering
merchants, who have been unjustly
deprived of their property in the
prosecution of a fair trade; nor
has any effectual provision been
made to remedy the evil or prevent
fUture spoliations of our commerce,
under like frivolous pretexts. No
restitution whatever is made ••• for
a large amount of property, carried
off from the southern states, contrary
to the late treaty of peace. 23
No mention was made of the debts due to British citizens,
however.
Charles Pinckney made his famous speech in St.
Michael's Church, Charleston, on .ruly 22, 1795. He condemned
the president for commencing the negotiations without previously submitting his intentions to the Senate • .ray was the
most improper man to undertake such a mission (which in the
opinion of Pinckney was dishonorable and treacherous). He
attacked the treaty with regard to commerce and neutrality.
23 Ibid., I, 200-201. According to one writer in the Am. Rem.,
~following cities were opposed to the treaty because of
their prejudice against England: Norf&lk and Portsmouth
because these cities were burned by the Brtttsh; Baltimore
because it was an asylum for the French; Philadelphia because the citizens were the sworn foes of royalty.

From the general content of the speech, one can tell the lack
of thought and logic that it contained. His arguments were
deficient in emphasis, and were distorted by his severe prejudice of the administration and its personnel. Whether he could
have negotiated a better treaty was open to question. He, undoubtedly should have shown more tact in presenting his arguments, for then they would have carried more weight.
Charleston was the center of opposition in the
South. The fact that the French were deeply imbedded there
account~d

in some way for the forcible resistance to the treaty

The treaty was offensive to France, and since she could do
nothing tangible to combat i t.s being adopted, her only weapon
was to arouse public opinion against it in the hopes of
staving off ratification. That France was working hard to
prevent the ratification came to the fore in the following
resolution ·or Williamsburg, south carolina:
Resolved, That we consider this treaty
as militating against the principles
of our constitution, as subjecting the
commerce of this country to Britain as a surrender of the power of congress
to form commercial regulations; and in
particular as hostile to the people of
France, with whom we ought to be on the
terms of friendship, if we were under
no obligation of gratitude, and if we
had not been bound by a former treaty
with that nation.H 24
24 Ibid., II, 272. (This was composed on August 5, 1795.)
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adjectives in condemning the treaty. This resolution also
showed· . a friendship for France:
Resolved unanimously, That the
aforesaid treaty strikes us, in
every point of light, withastonishment and indignation. It appears to
us mean, slavish, and obscure, nowise
equally binding; but conferring all
advantages on the one side, and imposing
all restraints on the other; degrading
to the dignity of an independent republic,
and insulting to the honor and spirit of
a brave people ••••
Resolved unanimously, That the
treaty appears to us, in every shape,
calculated to dissolve those bonds of
affection and interest, which ought to
connect us, in a friendship inviolate,
with the people of France, a great and
regenerated people •••• 25
The Southerners also opposed the British right to
search American vessels, but this was due to two reasons:
first of all the south always sought the protection of individual rights, and secondly because American ships were
carrying provisions to France.
When savannah criticized the treaty it was because
the United States received no political or commercial benefit
from it. In Georgia there were no legal impediments to the
recovery of debts, yet if the treaty went into effect, the
25 Ibid., 55. (This was written on dUly 25, 1795.)
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It is entirely silent on that important subject, the restoration of
negroes and other property carried
from this continent by the British
troops, in direct violation of the
treaty of 1783, to the disappointment,
and, in many instances, ruin of the
unfortunate citizens of the United
States, who have suffered the unwarrantable measure; whereas the
British government and courts of law,
where attempts have been made to
recover by that means, have repeatedly
held out assuranc.es of compensation.
Even this paltry privilege{Irade
in the West Indie€)is rendered of very
small use to Amerlaan merchants by
their being positively restricted from
exporting the produce of the West Indies
to any part of the world in their own
vessels; and, in exahange for this
pretended advantage, the treaty has
relinquished the right of exporting
cotton, the growth of our own soil,
and one of the most important staples
of the southern states, in American
vessels to foreisn ports. 26
Richmond County, Virginia maintained the same
argument regarding article twelve:
So that the other part of the same
article which prohibits the exportation of cotton from the United
states, is not included in theexception of the Senate.
This is particularly injurious
to this state; for the cultivation
of cotton has become, within these
26 Ibid.t I, 136-137.
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improvements .in machinery are extending its cultivation •••• A prohibition to export it would, therefore
be sensibly felt; and may have a
direct tendency to disaffect the
minds of the people to the seneral movement.
But it is said, that it may be exported in British bottoms. Admit this and
the injury is increased by the addition
of insult. To be restrained from exporting
the produce of our own fields, in our own
vessels, is to sct~mit, not to treat. 27
Georgia strongly opposed almost every provision
of the treaty, but senator Gunn's vote for ratification
caused all the more bitterness in the people:
In Georgia the popular sense
had been betrayed by the ratifieation vote of Senator Gunn, the
bitterness was sizzling. 28
It had been said that the demonstration in the
state of Virginia was the worst ot all, but on the contrary,
two counties in Virginia sent their resolutions approving the
treat.y to the president. In Richmond, however, the people were
united in their opposition:
unanimously, That, considering
the treaty now offered by Great Britain
to America to be
Insulting to the dignity,
Injurious to the intereat,

Resolve~

2?Ibid., II, August and September, 1?95, 48.
2B:sowera, 283.
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Dangerous to the security, and
Repugnant to the constitution,
of the Unlted States:
We, the citizens of Richmond, hold it,
therefore, not only unbecoming fresnen
to be silent, but that under the strong
impressions, which mature reflection has
rivetted on our minds, we should deem it
criminal, in the highest degree, not to
give our entire and pointed disapprobation
of the instrument. 29
The influence of the French was evident in the
resolution of Amelia,County, Virginia:
These articles{!eventh and otherrif
we consider as most shameful and
pernicious, inasmuch as they appear
calculated to depress the agricultural
and commercial interest of those states,
and at the same time operate most cruelly
against that gallant people, who so
generously and effectually afforded
us their powerful support, when the
armies and fleets of Ureat Britain had
a near prospect of completing our
subjugation.
6th, Because, The whole: treaty, in
all its aspects, appears to be entirely
calculated for the aggrandizement of
Great Britain, and the extension of her
commerce; to the destruction of American
prosperity, and, eventually her independence,
and to the abolition of that connection
with France. 30
This was Washington's home state, how did he feel
about these many resolutions which affect him? In a letter to
Henry Knox, he stated:
29 Am. Rem., I, July
. 29, 1795, 133.

30 Ibid., II, 45.
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MOUNT VERNON, 20

Sept~ber,

1795.

MY DEAR SIR,

The t~per of the people of this State,
particularly the southern part of it, and of
South Carolina and Georgia, as tar as it is
discoverable from the several meetings and
resolutions, which have been published, is
adverse to the treaty with Great Britain; and
yet I doubt much whether the great body of
yeomanry have formed any opinion on the subject,
and whether, it their sense could be fairly
taken under a plain and simple statement of
facta, nine tenths of them woUld not advocate
the measure. But with such abominable misrepresentations as appear in most of the proceedings,
it is not to be wondered at, that uninformed
minds should be affrighted at the dreadful
consequences that are predicted, and which
they are taught to expect from the ratification
of su~ a diabolical instrument, as the treaty
is dwnominated. From North Carolina we hear
little concerning it, and from Kentucky .
nothing. 31
From this letter it could be said that washington did not
rely too much upon the various and sundry resolutions that
were forthcoming from the south. He felt that the treaty was
being misrepresented, and if the people would do any thinking
they would slowly begin to favor the instrument.
Westmoreland and Frederic counties of Virginia
approved the document. From all of the information that was
accessible to the author, these two counties in this state
were the only two ,in the South to approve. This was noteworthy
31 washington-Writings, 106. The italics are the author•s.

-170because Virginia seemed to be violently opposed to all
parts of the treaty. By approving, however, Virginia had more
to gain regarding the debts due to Britain. Americans from
other states would be taXed to pay otf the debts, the majority
of which were contracted by Virginians.
Frederic County:
1st. Resolved, That the conduct of
the president of the United States,
in ratifying, agreeably to the advice
of 2-3 of the Senate of the United
states, the treaty of amity, commerce,
and navigation, between the United States
of America and Great~Britain, negooiated
by John Jay, esq. is entitled to, and
meets with, the entire approbation of
this meeting. 32
Westmoreland County:
Resolved, That in the late negociation
with Great Britain, its primary objective,
the preservation of peace, has been
completely effected, which, of itself,
is all-important, and that very considerable
additional good has also been acquited
by the surrender of the western posts,
which leads to the termination of Indian
warfare, and compensation for the spoliations on our commerce.
Resolved, therefore, That we feel
ourselves perfectly satisfied with the
government of the United States in this
transaction •••• 33
G2 Am. Rem., III, December 1, 1795, 144.
33 ~·, September 29, 1795, 312.
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What conclusions can be drawn

~rom

this infor-

mation about the reception of the treaty? A writer, under
the pseudonym

- A Mentor - for the Lancaster Journez, wrote

the following critical evaluation of the varied sentiments.
(It was colored to a marked degree.}
In Boston, not more than thirty-two
of the actual merchants were supposed
to appear in support of it.
In Philadelphia, and where the
mania aeaned to have the most effect,
and where the influence of bank directors,
stock jobbers, &e. had its tull weight,
410 are said to have signed the address
in favor of it. - But are these all
merchants? No! Among than are shbpkeepers,
booksellers, brokers, gentlemen &c. - an
intermixed phalanx.
so far the mercantile interest,
which the president has vouehsafed to
say, is 'directly affected.' Of those
whose interests could not be 'affected,'
as they were not merchants, the number
is few indeed. - A meeting near Trenton,
and one in the populous borough of York,
were among the principal; and I think I
may venture to assert, that not more than
400 of this class of partizans have
collected in the whole.
Thus we may form some idea of the
respectable ~nd formidable support the
treaty has received - 1000 merchants,
stock jobbers, bank-directors, and a few
influenced artizans, &c ••
Now let us search for something like
a contra or supra credit, to over balance

-172this tremendous[being raotious]debit.
In Charleston, Philadelphia, New York,
Boston, and Portmaouth, where the
meeting against the treaty were nearly
unanimous in their voice, at least
25,000 citizens are supposed to have
attended - add to this, the numerous
meetings throughout the union ••••
Out of at least 40,000 independent
citizens of the. United States, who
preserve the spirit and dignity or
exercising their rights on this interesting
occasion, cannot a sufficiency of respectability be procured, to outweigh that of
100 flatterers of administration: 34
Marshall drew these conclusions:
The treaty, therefore, when exposed
to the public view, found one party
prepared for a bold and intrepid attack,
but the other, not ready in its defence.
To the passions, the prejudices, and the
feelings of the nation, an appeal might
confidently be made by those whose only
object was its condemnation; but reflection,
information, and consequently time, were
required by men whose first impressions
were not in its favour, but who were
indisposed to yield absolutely to those
impressions.
Many intelligent men, therefore,
stood aloof,.while the most intemperate
assumed, as usual, the name of the people;
pronounced a definitive and unqualified
condemnation of every article in the
treaty; and with the utmost confidence
assigned reasons for their opinions,
which in many instances, had only an
imaginary existence; and in some,were
obviously founded on the strong prejudices
which were entertained with respect to
foreign powers. 35
34 Ibid., II, 201-202.
35 John Marshall, The Life of George Washin~ton, 624-526.
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The opposition, although seemingly unified, was
sectional. Naturally the people who had least to gain opposed
it the most. From all indications it was favorable to the
economic interests of the North, while it neglected the interests of the south, The North, however, looked askance on the
supposed advantages that it obtained.

Mr.

Bowers presented a very good summary of the

people's reaction to the treaty:
These marching mobs, mass meetings,
resolutions and petitions, and banning
effigies give no conception of the
popular fBrment. Never had the people
been more agitated or outraged. Whenever
two men met whether bankers or bakers,
the treaty was the topic of their talk.
In taverns, where travelers were promiscuously packed like sardines in a
box, the quarreling made night hideous
and sleep impossible.
The farmers were against the treaty,
the lawyers for it, and they debated
with passion, with more heat than
light •••• soon the anti-treaty press
was publishing statistics on public
sentiment. The mass meetings against
and the selec.t gatherings of the
merchants. Fifteen thousand people
had met and denounced the treaty, and
seven hundred had approved it, according
to the Independent Chron±ele. 35

36 Bowers, 28'1.
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CONCLUSION
Neutrality, as a new principle of international
law in 1793, served as the basis for America's future

foreig~

policy. American history was changed because of this doctrine.
It was not necessary at the time, as America had no resources
with whiah to engage in warfare. If America had felt that she
was boliged to enter hostilities as France's ally, her positio
in the world in 1815 (end of the war) would have been very
dubious,to say the least, for she would have been on the losin
side. England certainly would have taken advantage of her
superior position.
In the proclamation washington had no·, intention
'of aiding Britain by the position that America took. He hoped
to be on friendly terms with both'oontestants, but not with
the intentions that permeated the minds of some Americans.
They hoped to gain economically from America's position.
Washington's aims were centered about diplomacy and government.
The very fact that America remained neutral, and
took the first steps towards conciliation with Britain, after
the harmful Orders in council, showed America's purposes and
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willingness to conciliate matters. washington knew that the
country was not prepared for war, and his clear, steady
thinking led him to this pacific settlement with Britain.

Although this conciliation (Jay's Treaty) only postponed the
war until 1812. The reason being that the issues of the War
of 1812 were not provided for in the Jay Treaty, impreasment
of seamen, etc ••
Professor Moore presented a fine conclusion of
America's position in 1793, by quoting William Hall:
'The policy of the United States in
1793,' says the late W.E. Hall, one
of the ~ost eminent of English publicists,
'constitutes an epoch in the development
of the usages of neutrality. There can
be no doubt that it was intended to give
effect to the obligations then incumbent
on neutrals. But it represented by far
the most advanced existing opinions as
to what those obligations were; and in
some points it even went further than
authoritative custom has up to the present
day advanced. In the main, however, it is
identical with the standard of conduct
which is now adopted by the comrnunity
of nations.' 1
JAY'S TREATY
Jay has been both praised and condemned for his
work. It was not the purpose of this work to praise or condemn,
but to present as thorough an analysis as was possible of all
aspec~s

of the treaty.
Jay was a well qualified diplomat, in that, he

1 J. Moore, The Principles of American Diplomacy, Harper &
Brothers, New York, 1918, 47.

-175-

knew the constitution and its limitations, and he could apply
this knowledge to advantage in negotiating a treaty. This
knowledge was not sufficient for a diplomat, however, for he
must have skill, and a. sense of mediation, and ttgood common
s~nsen.

From the outcome of the treaty, it would

se~

that

Jay inclined too muCh towards this sense of mediation. He was
not schooled in the proficiency of diplomacy. England was very
fortunate in having Lord Grenville aa a negotiator, since he
was a good diplomat. The fact that he represented a great
power was an advantage in wringing concessions from Jay.
The envoy certainly worked under many handicaps,
for he had nothing with which to threaten

Great Britain.

He represented a new government, whose sea power was nil when
compared to the naval strength of the •Mistress of the seas•.
He could not abandon the negotiations and precipitate a war
that would have ruined America financially and commercially,
to say nothing of the tremendous loss of lives.
His one trump card, so to speak, was snatched
away by an indiscretion of his colleague, Hamilton. England,
in the beginning, :teared that the United States woald join
the armed neutrality, which was being formed by sweden and
Denmark, against England. In Jay's instructions he was given
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permission to find the ministers of these two countries, and
discuss the possibility of America's membership in the said
neutrality. England was more inclined to conciliation when
she was under this fear. Jay could have used this to America's
advantage.
Hamilton wrote to Hammond, who in turn passed the
information on to Grenville, that the United States had no
intention of joining the neutrality. Hamilton was given no
authority to make such a state111ent. He knew Hammond would rela
the news to Grenville. Naturally when Grenville learned this,
he stiffened his apposition. Jay lost his best opportunity
through no fault of his own. Professor Bemis believed that the
instrument should have been called "Hamilton's Treaty", sinc6
Jay acted under Hamilton's "suggestions•, thus any blame for
the shortcomings at the treaty should be shouldered by Hamilton
3ay did not gain any personal advance tor undertaking the task, in tact he had to take much criticism and
abuse. The people who cri tieized the most, probably would have.
been a failure at such a task thsnselves. Besides his

se~ing

unpopularity, he was elected governor ot New York. He was
courageous enough to carry out this mission for his government
with little thought for himself personally.
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Although J"ay should not have abandoned the interests of his country so readily, he dUlhis best under the
trying circumstances. He even admitted that it was "dry business".

Mr.

Mona~an

stated:

Jay had obtained the minimum of demands
establish&Q by the Federalist leaders;
evacuation of the posts, compensation
for spoliations, and the maintenance
ot existing commercial relations.
Beyond these he secured but little of
substantial value and accepted minor
stipulations that were unnecessarily
humiliating. He attempted to write
into the treaty more liberal definitions
ot neutral rights and the more advonced
principles of maritime law, but he
realized that it was hopeless to expect
England to surrender th.e principles upon
which much of her naval streng'Ul was
based unless she was forced to do so by
armed intervention. Jay admitted realistically
in sending the treaty home 'that Britain,
at this period, and invol.ved in war should.
not admit principles, which would impeach
the propriety of her conduct in seizing
provisions bound to France and enemy's
property in neutral ships, does not appear
to me extraordinary. The artieles as theynow stand secure compensation for seizures,
and leave us at liberty to decide whether
they were made in such cases as to be
warranted by the existing law ot nations.'
Compensation to Americans tor British
spoliations amount.e~ to more than ten
million dollars. 2
2

F. Monaghan, John J"ay, Bobbs-Merril.l co., Indianapolis, 1955,
381.
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America made this treaty with Britain at the wrong time with
respect to neutral rights, for Britain would not recognize
any neutral rights that would work to the advantage of France.
Later on when she did not have to protect herself she might
have been more amenable.
The treaty introduced two principles into American
diplomacy: the peacefUl arbitration of disputes, and the mutual extradition of persons. For these along day should receive
commendation. Arbitration of disputes has saved many delicate
situations in American history since that time.
If the treaty was viewed from the immediate interests at that time, it was easy to understand why it was condemned by the

House of Representatives and the people. The

condemnation was inevitable. The people were not ready to
form an alliance with their old enemy, England. They were
more inclined toward France because of the aid that country
gave in the Revolutionary War. Also the fact that some parts
of the treaty contravened the previous treaty with France
made it all the more objectionable. The people also felt that
it was unfavorable to their sectional interests. The commercial
class received all of the so-called benefits. If the treaty
can be viewed with the idea that it was an inspiration for the
growth of international consciousness, it was a light to the
world.
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APPENDIX - II
GRENVILLE'S PROPOSALS

1. A line due west from Lake Superior
to Red Lake River, then down this
river to the Mississippi. 'Jlhis line
was impossible, as the line with the
question mark indicates.
2. A line due north from the confluence
of the Mississippi and the st. Croix
to the waterway between the· Lake-ofthe-Woods to Lake superior. This
again was impossible.
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III

WASHINGTON'S ANSWER TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REQ.UESTING THE PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE TREATY

Gentlemen ot the House ot Representatives:
With the utmost attention I have considered your
resolution of the 24th instant, requesting me to lay before
your House a copy of the instructions to the Mlnister of the
United states, who negotiated the Treaty with the king of
Great Britain, together with the correspondence and other
documents r,elative to that Treaty, excepting such of the said
papers as any existing negotiations ,ay render improper to be
disclosed.
In deliberating upon·this subject, ~t was impossible for me to lose sight or the principle which some have
avowed in its discussion, or to avoid extending my views to
tha consequences which must flow from the admission of that
principle.
I trust that no part of my conduct has ever indicated a disposition to withhold any information whien the
constitution has enjoined upon the President, as a duty, to
give, or which could be required of him by ~ither House of
Congress as a right; and, with truth, I affirm, that it has
been as it will continue to be, while I have the honor to
preside in the Government, my constant endeavor to harmonise
with the other branehes thereof, so far as the trust delegated
to me by the people of the United States, and my sense of the
obligation it imposes, to 'preserve, protect, and defend the
constitution,' will permit.
The nature of foreign negotiations requires
caution; and then success mus often depend on secrecy; and
even, when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all
the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have
been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic;
for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations; or produce immediate ~naonveniences, perhaps danger
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and mischief, in relation to other Powers the necessity of
such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for resting
the power of making Treaties in the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate; the principle on which the body
was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit,
then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand, and
to have, as a matter of course, all the papers respecting a
negotiation with a foreign Power, would be to establish a
dangerous precedent.
It does not occur that the inspection of papers
asked for can be relative to any purpose under the cognizance
of the House of Representatives, except that of an impeachment;
which the resolution has not expressed. I repeat, that I have
no disposition to withhold any information which the duty of
my station will permit, or the public good shall require; to
be disclosed; and, in fact, all the papers affecting the
negotiation with Great Britain were· laid before the Senate,
when the Treaty itself was communicated for their consideration
and advice.
Having been a member of the General Convention, •••
I have ever entertained but one opinion on this subject, and
from the first establishment of the Government to this moment,
my conduct has exemplified that opinion, that the power of
making Treaties is exclusively vested in the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided 2-3
of the Senators present concur; and that every Treaty so made,
and promulgated, thenceforward became the law of the land.
As, therefore, it is perfectly clear to my understanding, that the assent of the House of Representatives is
not necessary to the validi t.y of a Treaty; as the Treaty
with Great Britain exhibits in itself all the objects requiring
Legislative provision. And these papers called for can throw
no light; and it is essentiql to the due administration of the
Government, that the boundaries fixed by the constitution
between the different departments should be preserved - a just
regard to the constitution and to the duty of my office, under
all the circumstances of this ease, forbid a compliance with
your request.
G. Washington
United States, March 30, 1796.
This was taken from T. Benton's Abridgment of the Debates of
Congress, 693.

-185APPENDIX -

IV
PRIVATE LETTER FROM WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON
REGARDING THE REQ.UE3T FOR THE PAPERS
FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PHILADELPHIA, 31 March, 1796.
MY DEAR SIR,

From the first moment, and from the fullest
conviction in my own mind, I had resolved to resist the
principle , whiah was evidently intended to be established
by the call of the Ho. of Representatives; and only deliberated on the in which this could be done with the
least bad consequences.
To effeot this, three modes presen~e4 themselves
to me. lst, a denial of the Papers in toto, assigning
concise but cogent reasons for that denial; 2d, to grant
them in whole; or, 3d, in part; aeoompani ed with a pointed
protest against the right of the House to controul
treaties, or to aall for Papers without specifying their
object, and against the compliance being drawn into precedent.
I had as little hesitation in deciding, that the
first was the most tenable ground; but, from the peculiar
circumstano.es of this case, 1~ merited consideration,
if the principle could be saved, whether f~cility in the
provisions might not result from a compliance. An attentiv
examination, however, of the Papers and the subject,
soon convinced me that to furnish all the Papers would
be highly improper, and that a partril delivery of them
would leave the door open for as much calumny as the
entire refusal -perhaps more so - as it might, and I
have no doubt would be said, that all such as were
essential to the purposes of the House were withheld.

This is quoted from Washington- Writings, 181.
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APPENDIX- V
ANALYSIS OF THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
OF 'rHE TREATY AB PRESENTED BY

EDMUND RANDOLPH

Advantages:

(1} Old bickerings were settled;
except for impresament.
(2) Indian wars were at an end;
they were started by Britain
(3) New opportunities were presented
for extending trade.
(4) Ports were surrendered by
the British.
(5) Captures of American vessels
were to be compensated (later
on by decision of a committee).
(6} Britain was interested in securing
to the United States the use of
the Mississippi River.
Disadvantages:

{1) Loss of negroes and compensation
for them.

(2) Assumption

o~ debts due to
British creditors.
(3) Lands may be taken from the
United States by the indulgence
of the British settlers.
(4) Situation of provisions being
listed as contraband.
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Doubtful Advantages:
(1) East India trade.
(2) European trade not too
doubtful, but or peculiar
advantage.
Recommended Ratification:
{l) Non-interruption of commerce.
{2) cannot be thrown into foreign
politics by the outrages or
another.
{3) Some prospect of extending
.Am.eri can commerce with the
Briti~ dominions.
(4) Cannot be on ill terms with
France or Britain.
Dissuades Rejection:
(l) Latitude of authority with
(2)
(3)

{4)

(5)
{6)

which Jay was vested, and his not
having exceeded it.
Little expectation of obtaining
a much better treaty.
Possibility or convulsions with
France, and re-inspiring Great
Britain's former arrogance.
Impression which a refusal to.
ratify would make on the public
national character - not all
the advantages were on one side.
Postpon~ent or the surrender
of the posts.
Exposure of 20 senators to
assault. It was a victory of
the minority in the Senate.

This was given by"Edmund Randolph on the British Treaty,

1795", The American Historical Review, Macmillan Co.,
New York, 1907, XII, October 1906 to July 1907.
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EVALUATION OF THE TREATY ACCORDING TO

A. J. DALLAS

1. Origin and Progress of the Negotiation.
2. Nothing was settled by the Treaty.
5. Treaty contained a colorable but no real
reciprocity.
4. The treaty was an instrument of party.
5. Treaty violated the general principles of
neutrality and was in collision with possible
previous arrangements whieh subsisted between
America and France.
a. Britain gained time and an opportunity
to turn the war in her favor.
b. Britain gained supplies ror her
West ·India colonies during the war.
c. Britain gained the advantage over
France by prohibiting the exportatimn
of sugar, thus Frenoh colonies would
remain without supplies.
d. Another gain of Britain's was that
her vessels, to any extent of tonnage,
could carry on the West India trade
and supply domestic and European
engagements.
e. They could use American ports for
asylum.
6. The Treaty was calculated to injure the united
states in the friendship and favor of other
foreign nations.
7. The Treaty is impolitic and pernicious in
respect to domestic interests and the happiness
of the United States.
a. The British Treaty and the Constitution of the
United states were at war with ~ch other.
This was taken from A.J. Dallas, "Features of Mr. Jay's
Treaty", Life and Writinfs of Alexander J. Dallas,
ed. by George Mifflin Da las, J".B. Lippincott & Co.,
Philadelphia, 1871.
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APPENDIX - VII
C01WARISON OF THE ACTUAL STATE AND THE
STATE ACCORDING TO THE TREATY
BY A. J.

DALLAS

Actual state - American ships of any size could
go to the West Indies.
By Treaty
- American ships o:r seventy tons
burden were permitted.
Actual state - Load molasses to any port in
the world.
By Treaty
- Prohibited the shipping of
molasses to any port.
Actual state - Regulate commerce to encourage
one nation and discourage another.
By Treaty
- Abandoned this right, for there
was to be no duty on British goods.
Actual state - Freedom of navigation to the
British dominion in East India.
By Treaty
- America was admitted to the East
India dominion, but was prohibited
from carrying on the coasting trade.
Actual state - Provisions were not contraband.
By Treaty
- Provisions were deemed contraband
of war.
Actual State - Free ships-free goods.
By Treaty
- America waived this claim and
accepted the old principle,
enemy ships-enemy goods.
Actual State - American ports were opened to
prizes made on Rri tain by France.
By Treaty
- American ports were only open to
Britain and shut to the prizes taken
from Britain and Spain.
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Actual state - America eould freely enter British
ports in the West Indies and Europe.
By Treaty
- American vessels were allowed only
to the ports that were unrestricted
by Britain.

This also was taken from A.J. Dallas "Features of
Mr. Jay's Treaty"~
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